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 IS ASSISTED PROCREATION AN LGBT RIGHT? 
MICHAEL BOUCAI* 
 A movement long identified with the notion that “love makes a 
family” today flirts dangerously with the dogma that “blood is thicker than 
water.” Biogeneticism, an ideology that favors biological modes of kinship 
and genetic conceptions of identity, informs many LGBT individuals’ 
choices about why and how to have children. In turn this ideology marks 
two troubling features of political efforts to facilitate LGBT parenthood: 
first, the markedly different understandings of equality—full versus formal, 
lived versus legal—that guide movement approaches to assisted procreation 
and adoption, respectively; and second, invocations of a fundamental “right 
to procreate” that valorize reproduction, idealize a biological model of 
parenthood, and threaten to entrench biogenetic bias in family law and 
constitutional doctrine. 
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INTRODUCTION 
Is assisted procreation an LGBT right? 
The question lends itself to multiple interpretations. A reader of 
law reviews might justifiably understand it to ask whether there is a 
right to use assisted reproductive technologies (ARTs) and whether that 
right extends to people who are lesbian, gay, bisexual, and transgender 
(LGBT). Taken literally, the question might also be construed to ask 
whether LGBT individuals have a special claim to this right—that is, 
whether access to ARTs is an entitlement that LGBT people possess 
precisely by virtue of their sexual orientation or gender identity. 
This Article undertakes neither inquiry. It makes no normative 
arguments about the existence or content of the right to procreate, nor 
any suggestion that LGBT identity is a unique source of reproductive 
entitlements. Instead it interrogates assisted procreation’s growing 
prominence in the politics of LGBT parenthood. When and why did 
access to ARTs become an LGBT-rights issue? Should it remain so? If 
yes, how can efforts to enable LGBT procreation be harmonized with 
longstanding movement ideals and distinctively “queer family values”?1 
These questions are not so much new as newly salient. For several 
decades, organizations and individuals identified with the LGBT 
movement have worked to rid the ART market of discrimination based 
on sexual orientation, gender identity, and marital status. At the same 
time, they have urged various sectors of society to permit, deregulate, 
and subsidize a range of reproductive technologies. Under the banner of 
LGBT rights, advocates and scholars have challenged an array of 
“barriers to access,”2 from gaps in insurance coverage to prohibitions 
of anonymous sperm donation to bans on human cloning. Such 
“barriers” are condemned for infringing the fundamental right to 
procreate and for discriminating against LGBT people, who are 
disproportionately unable or unwilling to have kids “the old-fashioned 
way.”3 
 
 1. I borrow the expression from VALERIE LEHR, QUEER FAMILY VALUES: 
DEBUNKING THE MYTH OF THE NUCLEAR FAMILY (1999). 
 2. For uses of this phrase, see Valarie Blake, It’s an ART Not a Science: 
State-Mandated Insurance Coverage of Assisted Reproductive Technologies and Legal 
Implications for Gay and Unmarried Persons, 12 MINN. J.L. SCI. & TECH. 651, 654 
(2011); Judith F. Daar, Accessing Reproductive Technologies: Invisible Barriers, 
Indelible Harms, 23 BERKELEY J. GENDER L. & JUST. 18, 22 (2008); Stu Marvel, 
Polymorphous Reproductivity and the Critique of Futurity: Toward a Queer Legal 
Analytic for Fertility Law, 4 JINDAL GLOBAL L. REV. 294, 309 (2013). 
 3. See infra note 64 and accompanying text (quoting gay rights pioneer Frank 
Kameny).  
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As several commentators observed in the wake of Obergefell v. 
Hodges,4 the triumph of “marriage equality” provides doctrinal and 
rhetorical fodder for claims that assisted procreation is indeed an LGBT 
right.5 In August 2016, when three lesbian couples challenged in 
federal court a New Jersey insurance law that defines infertility by 
reference to two years of regular heterosexual intercourse, their 
complaint led with the assertion, quoting Obergefell, that parenthood, 
“just like marriage,” “is essential to our most profound hopes and 
aspirations.”6 The plaintiffs went on to argue that Obergefell’s 
reasoning “compels states like New Jersey to treat heterosexual and 
same-sex couples equally” in regulating infertility treatment.7 
Marriage equality’s impact also has been felt in the campaign to 
lift New York’s prohibition of remunerated surrogacy.8 In 2013, less 
than two years after New York granted same-sex couples the right to 
marry,9 and then again in 2015, the same year Obergefell extended that 
right nationwide,10 State Senator Brad Hoylman introduced legislation 
to permit “surrogate parenting contracts.”11 The move was both 
“personal and political.”12 Although Holyman and his partner (now 
 
 4. 135 S. Ct. 2584 (2015). 
 5. See, e.g., Courtney Megan Cahill, The Oedipus Hex: Regulating Family 
After Marriage Equality, 49 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 183, 249 (2015) (“[T]he marriage 
equality precedent . . . not only extends relational equality to same-sex couples, but 
also reproductive—and family formation—equality to them.”); Douglas NeJaime, 
Griswold’s Progeny: Assisted Reproduction, Procreative Liberty, and Sexual 
Orientation Equality, 124 YALE L.J.F. 340, 342 (2015) (“[I]f same-sex marriage 
signifies [a] family-based equality . . . premised on the liberty interests at stake in . . . 
procreative and familial decision-making, then [it] casts serious doubt on attempts to 
restrict access to ART . . . .”); Douglas NeJaime, Marriage Equality and the New 
Parenthood, 129 HARV. L. REV. 1185, 1187 (2016) (counting ART-facilitated 
parenthood among “a new generation of issues emerging in marriage equality’s wake”). 
Opponents of same-sex marriage anticipated this logic long ago. See Brief for Appellee 
at 10–11, Jones v. Hallahan, 501 S.W.2d 588 (Ky. Ct. App. 1973) (No. W-152-70) 
(warning that legalizing “uni-sexual marriages” would embolden efforts to create 
families “by either artificial insemination or adoption”). 
 6. Second Amended Complaint at 1, 18, Krupa v. Porrino, No. 16-cv-4637, 
(D.N.J. Oct. 13, 2016) (quoting Obergefell, 135 S. Ct. at 2594). 
 7. Id. at 2. 
 8. See infra note 11 and accompanying text. 
 9. N.Y. DOM. REL. LAW § 10-a (Consol. 2011). 
 10. See Obergefell, 135 S. Ct. at 2607. 
 11. N.Y. DOM. REL. LAW §§ 121–24 (Consol. 2016) (“Surrogate Parenting 
Contracts”); S.B. 2547, 2013 Leg., Reg. Sess. (N.Y. 2013) (“Eliminates the 
prohibition on surrogate parenting contracts"); S.B. 4617, 2013 Leg., Reg. Sess. (N.Y. 
2013) (“Establishes the child-parent security act” dealing with assisted procreation 
more broadly). 
 12. Alexandra Sifferlin, Battle Over Paid Surrogacy Opens New Front, TIME 
(Jan. 28, 2015), http://time.com/3666606/battle-over-paid-surrogacy-opens-new-front/ 
[https://perma.cc/KRU4-J2WK]. 
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husband) managed to circumvent their own jurisdiction’s law by taking 
their business to California, the birth of their daughter in 2011 was, 
according to The New York Times, tarnished by “a frisson of the illicit 
that seem[ed] to them . . . archaic and unfair in the post-marriage-
equality world.”13 A spokesperson for the Empire State Pride Agenda 
explained: “[Y]ou know how the phrase goes—first comes love, then 
comes marriage, then comes the baby and the baby carriage.”14 
Senator Hoylman’s story attests to the intensely private desires that 
invigorate LGBT efforts to reform the ART market. Many LGBT 
people want to become parents, and ARTs promise to fulfill that wish—
sometimes with fewer bureaucratic hurdles and less expense than 
adoption,15 the most obvious alternative.16 But these technologies do not 
merely produce children; they furnish offspring. In this crucial respect, 
ARTs appeal to American society’s pervasive biogeneticism, its deep-
seated faith in the priority and superiority of biogenetic forms of 
 
 13. Anemona Hartocollis, And Surrogacy Makes 3, N.Y. TIMES (Feb. 19, 
2014), http://www.nytimes.com/2014/02/20/fashion/In-New-York-Some-Couples-
Push-for-Legalization-of-Compensated-Surrogacy.html [https://perma.cc/WC34-
L9YG]. See also Wedding Announcement for Brad Hoylman and David Sigal, N.Y. 
TIMES (Feb. 24, 2013), http://www.nytimes.com/2013/02/24/fashion/weddings/brad-
hoylman-david-sigal-weddings.html [https://perma.cc/Y7XK-B75S]. 
 14. Hartocollis, supra note 13. For other LGBT-rights framings of the repeal 
effort in New York, see Glenn Blain, Gay Rights Advocates Fight to Lift Ban on Paying 
Surrogate Moms, N.Y. DAILY NEWS (Jan. 15, 2014), 
http://www.nydailynews.com/news/politics/push-nys-ban-paying-surrogate-moms-
article-1.1581165 [https://perma.cc/3UVR-BZD2]; Frank Lowe, The Surrogacy 
Roadblock, ADVOCATE (Feb. 24, 2014), 
http://www.advocate.com/parenting/2014/02/24/surrogacy-roadblock 
[https://perma.cc/J79F-L82T] (arguing that, “[w]ith the growing number of gay 
couples looking to have children,” New York’s ban “will have to change sooner rather 
than later”); Paul Schindler, When Gay Men Want to Be Biological Dads, GAY CITY 
NEWS (Oct. 30, 2014), http://gaycitynews.nyc/gay-men-want-biological-dads/ 
[https://perma.cc/84HX-5GJ5] (contrasting New York’s “respectable sixth place in 
terms of giving [same-sex] couples the right to marry” with its foreclosure of gay 
men’s “primary route” to becoming a “biological father”); Issues, BRAD HOYLMAN FOR 
SENATE, http://bradhoylman.com/issues/#lgbt [https://perma.cc/WSL6-WPRP] (last 
visited Oct. 26, 2016) (listing surrogacy legalization among priorities for achieving 
“full LGBT equality at the state level”). 
 15. See, e.g., MAUREEN SULLIVAN, THE FAMILY OF WOMAN: LESBIAN 
MOTHERS, THEIR CHILDREN, AND THE UNDOING OF GENDER 43–45 (2004) (stating that 
most of the lesbian mothers in Sullivan’s study “said that they decided not to adopt 
because it was their impression that getting pregnant was easier”). 
 16. Adoption and assisted procreation are not mutually exclusive. Many 
second-parent adoptions, for example, involve one woman who, by virtue of a 
biological relationship, is a legal parent from birth and another who assumes parental 
status alongside the first. In such an arrangement, both ART and adoption perform their 
characteristic functions: the former creates a biological link between an adult and a 
child, while the latter endows legal parenthood upon someone other than a biological 
parent. These contrasting relationships to biogenetic parenthood are, for present 
purposes, the defining features of ART and adoption, respectively. 
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relationship and identity.17 As scholars across a range of disciplines 
have perceived, ARTs reinforce some very conventional kinship norms, 
even as they enable the creation of undeniably “modern” families.18 
The queer households enabled by ART may well “rebut the 
presumption that [a] biological mother and a biological father must 
always lie at the heart of the reproductive family,”19 but in other ways 
they continue to locate biology, conjugality, and reproduction at the 
heart of kinship. 
Queer people are hardly impervious to the allure of biogenetic 
parenthood. Many LGBT ART users frankly admit their preference for 
a biological child,20 and some say “they would rather remain childless 
if they cannot have . . . [offspring] of their own.”21 Others more subtly 
reveal their biogenetic investments: lesbian couples who divide between 
them genetic and gestational motherhood; cisgender same-sex partners 
who search for gamete donors with physical characteristics that match 
those of the non-genetic parent; and individuals—again, usually in 
 
 17. “In [the] American cultural conception, kinship is defined as biogenetic,” 
an “objective fact of nature” that entails “a relationship of . . . common identity, 
expressed as ‘being of the same flesh and blood.’” DAVID M. SCHNEIDER, AMERICAN 
KINSHIP: A CULTURAL ACCOUNT 23–24 (2d ed. 1980). See also Introduction to 
FAMILIES BY LAW: AN ADOPTION READER 1, 4 (Naomi R. Cahn & Joan Heifetz 
Hollinger eds., 2004) (discussing “[b]iogeneticism and the companion . . . attitude that 
adoption is at best a risky ‘last resort’”). 
 18. See, e.g., NAOMI R. CAHN, THE NEW KINSHIP: CONSTRUING DONOR-
CONCEIVED FAMILIES 4 (2013) (observing how “people [who] choose to use donor 
sperm or eggs” both “challeng[e]” and “assimilat[e] . . . into the nuclear family model 
made up of those with genetic bonds”); Rachel Epstein, Introduction to WHO’S YOUR 
DADDY? AND OTHER WRITINGS ON QUEER PARENTING 13, 22 (Rachel Epstein ed., 2009) 
(suggesting that ART-enabled families both “challenge[] and . . . recreate . . . 
traditional notions of family, biology, blood, and kinship”); SARAH FRANKLIN, 
BIOLOGICAL RELATIVES: IVF, STEM CELLS, AND THE FUTURE OF KINSHIP 6–7 (2013) 
(noting that ARTs lend “a degree of flexibility to the reproduction of reproduction, 
while largely keeping the structure of bilateral, biological kinship norms intact”); 
Marilyn Strathern, Introduction to the First Edition of JEANETTE EDWARDS ET AL., 
TECHNOLOGIES OF PROCREATION: KINSHIP IN THE AGE OF ASSISTED CONCEPTION 9, 25 
(2d ed., Routledge 1999) (1993) (“[T]he emphasis Euro-Americans give to personal 
and kin identity via the facts of biology . . . is simultaneously reinforced and bypassed 
by the new reproductive technologies.”); CHARIS THOMPSON, MAKING PARENTS: THE 
ONTOLOGICAL CHOREOGRAPHY OF REPRODUCTIVE TECHNOLOGIES 177 (2005) (arguing 
that ARTs are at once “innovative ways of breaking free of bondage to old cultural 
categories of affiliation . . . [and are] part of a hegemonic reification of . . . stultifying 
ways of classifying and valuing human beings”). 
 19. Marvel, supra note 2, at 311. 
 20. See LESNIK-OBERSTEIN, infra note 107 and accompanying text. 
 21. Timothy F. Murphy, Assisted Gestation and Transgender Women, 29 
BIOETHICS 389, 393 (2015). 
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pairs—who await the advent of technologies that will allow them to 
create a child in no one’s image but their own.22 
Because the “biological bias”23 that affects LGBT ART use is so 
consistent with mainstream values, much of what this Article has to say 
will be relevant to non-LGBT procreation and unassisted reproduction. 
Its queer focus is justified, however, by the uptake of assisted 
procreation as an LGBT-rights issue—and, critically, by the ethic of 
“kinetic kinship” long associated with LGBT culture.24 Where 
biogeneticism holds that “blood is thicker than water,”25 queer politics, 
thought, and social life have reliably countered that love, not blood, 
makes a family.26 Championing a social and functionalist—as opposed 
to a biological and essentialist—conception of familial relationships, 
LGBT communities and their advocates have challenged the 
“bionormativity” of treating parenthood as a pre-social, “extra-legal” 
fact and the “repronormativity” of treating procreation as an “inevitable 
and natural” drive.27 
Will the LGBT movement abandon these insights now that the law 
allows gay marriage and science enables “queer reproduction?”28 In 
significant but not irreversible ways, it already has. In addition to 
 
 22. See infra Part II. Unless otherwise indicated, allusions to “same-sex 
couples” refer to relationships between two cisgender partners—i.e., two individuals 
whose gender identities conform to the sex assigned to each at birth. 
 23. Carolyn McLeod & Andrew Botterell, “Not for the Faint of Heart”: 
Assessing the Status Quo on Adoption and Parental Licensing, in FAMILY-MAKING: 
CONTEMPORARY ETHICAL CHALLENGES 151, 166 (Françoise Baylis & Carolyn McLeod 
eds., 2014) (using the term “biological bias” to describe “the belief that biological 
families are superior to . . . adoptive families”).  
 24. Elizabeth Freeman, Queer Belongings: Kinship Theory and Queer Theory, 
in A COMPANION TO LESBIAN, GAY, BISEXUAL, TRANSGENDER, AND QUEER STUDIES 
295, 305 (relating anthropologist Corrine Hayden’s juxtaposition of genetic and kinetic 
kinship to David Schneider’s “statement that kinship consists of ‘doing’ rather than 
‘being’”) (citing Corrine Hayden, Gender, Genetics, and Generation: Reformulating 
Biology in Lesbian Kinship, 10 CULTURAL ANTHROPOLOGY (1995) and SCHNEIDER, 
supra note 17). 
 25. SCHNEIDER, supra note 17, at 49. 
 26. See, e.g., GIGI KAESER, LOVE MAKES A FAMILY: PORTRAITS OF LESBIAN, 
GAY, BISEXUAL, AND TRANSGENDER PARENTS AND THEIR FAMILIES 3 (1999); Clare 
Riley, American Kinship: A Lesbian Account, 8 FEMINIST ISSUES 75, 84 (1998) 
(recalling that “Love Is What Makes a Family” was a popular slogan at the Second 
National March on Washington for Lesbian and Gay Rights in 1987); Judith Stacey, 
The Families of Man, 30 SIGNS 1911, 1912 (2005) (referring to gay men’s and lesbians’ 
insistence that “love makes a family”) (quoting KATH WESTON, FAMILIES WE CHOOSE: 
LESBIANS, GAYS, KINSHIP 107 (1991)). 
 27. I borrow these terms from Katharine K. Baker, Bionormativity and the 
Construction of Parenthood, 42 GA. L. REV. 649, 653–54 (2008) and Katherine M. 
Franke, Theorizing Yes: An Essay on Feminism, Law, and Desire, 101 COLUM. L. REV. 
181, 185 (2001). 
 28. See Marvel, supra note 2, at 297, 300 (contrasting “natural” with “queer 
reproduction” and introducing the term “queer reproductivity”). 
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giving expression and encouragement to the biogeneticist yearnings of 
many movement constituents, efforts to support LGBT family-building 
projects evince at least two troubling tendencies. First, there is a 
systematic double standard when it comes to adoption, a path to 
parenthood that, however strewn with obstacles, is nonetheless spared 
the claims of disparate-impact discrimination regularly asserted against 
barriers to ART. This double standard amounts to a transformative 
approach to assisted procreation and an acquiescent stance toward the 
current state of adoption policy and practice. Second, in their frequent 
reliance on the constitutional right to procreate, LGBT access-to-ART 
claims often reify biological parenthood’s inordinate prestige, much as 
same-sex couples’ invocations of the fundamental right to marry 
entrenched, nowhere more clearly than in Obergefell,29 a morally 
saturated and politically regressive vision of marriage. 
To be clear, this Article does not reject biogenetic parenthood per 
se. It rejects biogeneticism—the social and moral priority attaching to 
biogenetic ties and to notions of selfhood grounded in those ties. 
Exposing and opposing this ideology elsewhere has been a prominent 
feature of critical legal thought on the LGBT movement. For over a 
century, individuals with same-sex attractions have pled for civil rights 
and social tolerance on the ground that sexual orientation is 
“immutable,”30 a plea often understood, not least by many gay men and 
lesbians, to mean that homosexuality is “innate”—metaphorically in 
one’s blood and perhaps literally in one’s genes.31 But where “the 
immutability excuse” for gay equality has been subject to sharp 
criticism within and beyond the academy,32 biogeneticism in the politics 
of LGBT parenthood has been largely overlooked. Why? 
The question surely admits of multiple answers: the possibility that 
previously piecemeal and decentralized activism has only recently 
become visible as a movement-within-a-movement; the likelihood that 
marriage, so long as it dominated LGBT politics, has been for many 
 
 29. Obergefell v. Hodges, 135 S. Ct. 2584, 2591 (2015).  
 30. See Michael Boucai, Sexual Liberty and Same-Sex Marriage: An Argument 
From Bisexuality, 49 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 415, 468–70 (2012) (discussing the 
deployment of immutability arguments from the late nineteenth century to the early 
twenty-first century). 
 31. See JANET R. JAKOBSEN & ANN PELLEGRINI, LOVE THE SIN: SEXUAL 
REGULATION AND THE LIMITS OF RELIGIOUS TOLERANCE 76–77 (2003) (describing many 
LGBT people’s “sincerely held view” that “their identities [are] inborn”). 
 32. See, e.g., Janet E. Halley, Sexual Orientation and the Politics of Biology: 
A Critique of the Argument from Immutability, 46 STAN. L. REV. 503, 567 (1994); 
Edward Stein, Immutability and Innateness Arguments about Lesbian, Gay, and 
Bisexual Rights, 89 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 597, 597–600 (2014); Frank Bruni, Genetic or 
Not, Gay Won’t Go Away, N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 29, 2012), 
http://www.nytimes.com/2012/01/29/opinion/sunday/bruni-gay-wont-go-away-genetic-
or-not.html [https://perma.cc/7QJL-PB52].  
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observers a more urgent object of critical attention; and the fact that 
feminists, historically the surest skeptics of anything resembling 
pronatalism, are today more apt to frame reproduction as a choice that 
should be socially supported than one that is culturally coerced.33 
Perhaps most importantly, biological parenthood is widely understood 
as an unimpeachable prerogative,34 and in many progressive circles one 
finds a reluctance to so much as appear to “intru[de] [into] matters so 
fundamentally affecting a person as the decision . . . to bear or beget a 
child”35—a child who, once begotten, is the rightful object of protective 
impulses.36 
Respect for individual sensitivities and deference to the integrity of 
existing families should affect the tenor, not the possibility, of 
forthright discussion about whether, when, and how to claim an LGBT 
right to assisted procreation. As family law scholar Nancy Polikoff 
insisted in an early reflection on the lesbian “baby boom” of the 
1980s,37 “there is a difference between doing political analysis and 
making judgments.”38 More than a decade later, law professor Dorothy 
Roberts made a similar point in her trenchant account of the ART 
market’s racial dynamics. The purpose of that inquiry, she explained, 
was “not to judge individuals’ motivations, but to scrutinize the legal 
and political context which helps to both create and give meaning to 
 
 33. By the time law professor Katherine Franke wrote that one “risk[s] being 
labeled unfeminist” for critiquing “the complex ways in which reproduction is 
incentivized,” the view that motherhood is inherently limiting of women’s potential had 
largely given way to arguments for work-family balance and egalitarian parenthood. 
See Franke, supra note 27, at 184; JOAN WILLIAMS, UNBENDING GENDER: WHY FAMILY 
AND WORK CONFLICT AND WHAT TO DO ABOUT IT (2000); see also THOMPSON, supra 
note 18, at 67 (describing “a whole genre of feminist writing [that has] valorized 
womanhood itself and often equated it with motherhood or expressed it using 
maternalist metaphors”). 
 34. CHRISTINE OVERALL, WHY HAVE CHILDREN? THE ETHICAL DEBATE 4 
(2012) (challenging the assumption that the desire for a biological child “is either 
immune to or incapable of analysis and . . . ethical assessment”). 
 35. Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438, 453 (1972). 
 36. Sociologist Suzanna Danuta Walters, herself “a lesbian mother and a 
single parent,” has observed that political dialogue about LGBT parenting “gets 
personal pretty quickly.” SUZANNA DANUTA WALTERS, THE TOLERANCE TRAP 209 
(2014).  
 37. The word “boom” emphasized the phenomenon’s popularity, not its 
novelty. Lesbians had been having children by means of assisted insemination since the 
early 1970s. See AMY AGIGIAN, BABY STEPS: HOW LESBIAN ALTERNATIVE 
INSEMINATION IS CHANGING THE WORLD 12 (2004) (noting a 1975 conference at Harvard 
Medical School that included a workshop on lesbians and at-home insemination). 
 38. Nancy D. Polikoff, Lesbians Choosing Children, in POLITICS OF THE 
HEART: A LESBIAN ANTHOLOGY 48 (Sandra Pollack & Jeanne Vaughn eds., 1987). For 
a powerful illustration of political critique undertaken in a respectful and indeed loving 
register, see generally Darren Rosenblum et al., Pregnant Man?: A Conversation, 22 
YALE J.L. & FEMINISM 207 (2010).  
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[those] . . . motivations.”39 Maintaining this distinction—between 
personal criticism and political critique—seems especially important 
when charting the future of a movement that, in Polikoff’s words, was 
“built on the premise that the personal is political.”40 
This Article proceeds as follows. Part I surveys the contexts and 
rhetorics in which proponents of LGBT equality have fought to expand 
access to ARTs. Part II documents the biogeneticism that informs why 
and how many LGBT people deploy reproductive technologies. Part III 
traces a rich tradition of anti-biogeneticism over a half-century of 
LGBT politics, thought, and culture. It provides the historical and 
normative warrant for Part IV, which lodges a critique of the rights-
based claims—claims of equality and of procreative liberty—that 
permeate LGBT arguments about assisted reproduction. Finally, the 
Article’s Conclusion suggests what LGBT ART users themselves have 
to gain from a movement that takes biological and adoptive parenthood 
equally seriously and that tempers its reliance on the fundamental right 
to procreate. 
I. THE POLITICS OF LGBT PROCREATION 
For roughly a dozen years before the Supreme Court settled the 
matter in Obergefell, the most prominent legal justification for gay 
marriage bans was the so-called “responsible procreation” defense.41 
Different-sex couples, it was argued, need marriage to impose order 
and seriousness of purpose on their all-too-often accidental 
reproduction, whereas same-sex couples do not need marriage because 
they come by children deliberately, through adoption or with the help 
of ARTs.42 Aside from the backhanded compliment it paid to gay and 
lesbian parents,43 the argument was ironic in that many same-sex 
marriage opponents condemn the techniques of responsible procreation, 
 
 39. DOROTHY ROBERTS, KILLING THE BLACK BODY: RACE, REPRODUCTION, 
AND THE MEANING OF LIBERTY 287 (1997). 
 40. Polikoff, supra note 38, at 48 (emphasis added). 
 41. This argument appears to have entered the legal debate in Baker v. State, 
744 A.2d 864, 881 (Vt. 1999), the case that ultimately brought civil unions to 
Vermont, but Justice Cordy of Massachusetts was the first judge to credit it. See 
Goodridge v. Dep’t of Pub. Health, 798 N.E.2d 941, 995 (Mass. 2003) (Cordy, J., 
dissenting) (“[T]he institution of marriage has systematically provided for the regulation 
of heterosexual behavior [and] brought order to the resulting procreation . . . .”). 
 42. In fact, most children currently being raised by same-sex couples “were 
conceived in . . . different-sex relationships.” ABBIE E. GOLDBERG ET AL., WILLIAMS 
INST., RESEARCH REPORT ON LGB-PARENT FAMILIES 1 (2014). 
 43. “Heterosexuals get drunk and pregnant, producing unwanted children; 
their reward is to be allowed to marry. Homosexual couples do not produce unwanted 
children; their reward is to be denied the right to marry. Go figure.” Baskin v. Bogan, 
766 F.3d 648, 662 (7th Cir. 2014). 
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regardless of who uses them.44 The same “conjugal model” that posits 
marriage as a “union . . . intrinsically ordered to producing new life”45 
understands parenthood as “a natural relation following from biological 
reproduction by one man and one woman . . . .”46 Proponents of this 
model mistrust ARTs because of the cleavages these technologies 
“introduce[] between biology and parenthood[,] and, often, between 
marriage and parenthood.”47 They charge that ARTs violate a human 
right “to a natural biological heritage,” as well as a child’s right “to 
know and be raised by” two individuals who both combine “the 
biological, social, and legal dimensions of parenthood”48 and bring the 
distinctive qualities of men and women to the gendered roles of father 
and mother.49 
The same aspects of assisted procreation that trouble adherents of 
the conjugal model make it palatable or even attractive to those who 
favor a “diversity model.” This model “focus[es] on family function 
rather than family form,” “acknowledges various pathways to 
parenthood,” and “often includes a normative judgment that . . . 
[variety in family life] has value” in itself.50 Insofar as ARTs facilitate 
 
 44. Certain commenters do appear to reject ARTs only to the extent that they 
enable childbearing and childrearing by LGBT people. Patrick Steptoe, for example, 
“the ‘father’ of in vitro fertilization itself, [considered it] . . . ‘unthinkable to willingly 
create a child to be born into an unnatural situation such as a gay or lesbian 
relationship.’” Sarah Franklin, Essentialism, Which Essentialism?, 24 J. 
HOMOSEXUALITY 27, 31 (1993).  
 45. United States v. Windsor, 133 S. Ct. 2675, 2718 (2013) (Alito, J., 
dissenting). 
 46. Linda McClain & Daniel Cere, Introduction to WHAT IS PARENTHOOD?: 
CONTEMPORARY DEBATES ABOUT THE FAMILY 1, 2 (2013). 
 47. Id. at 3. 
 48. See David Blankenhorn, Address at the Danish Institute for Human 
Rights: The Rights of Children and the Redefinition of Parenthood 2, 7 (June 2, 2005), 
http://americanvalues.org/catalog/pdfs/family-humanrights.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/MLX3-R377]. Some commentators claim that “intentionally,” 
“deliberately,” raising children apart from even one of their biological parents is a 
“selfish and harmful” act that brings into the world “half-orphaned” individuals 
“stripped of part of [their] heritage.” See Lynn D. Wardle, Global Perspective on 
Procreation and Parentage by Assisted Reproduction, 35 CAP. U. L. REV. 413, 453 
(2006); Camille S. Williams, Planned Parent-Deprivation, 4 WHITTIER CHILD & FAM. 
ADVOC. 375, 376 (2004). For a sophisticated analysis of the “flattened, misleading 
image of identity formation” underlying arguments that “individuals have a right to 
know their genetic origins,” let alone a right to be brought up by their genetic parents, 
see Robert Leckey, Identity, Law, and the Right to a Dream?, 38 DALHOUSI L.J. 525, 
526–27 (2016). 
 49. See, e.g., Lynn D. Wardle, The Potential Impact of Homosexual 
Parenting on Children, 1997 U. ILL. L. REV. 833, 857 (“[M]en and women contribute 
different (gender-connected) strengths and attributes to their children's development.”). 
 50. McClain & Cere, supra note 46, 2–3. This model “reflects a traditional, 
and still common, understanding of parenthood as a natural relation following from 
biological reproduction by one man and one woman within marriage . . . .” Id. at 2. 
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the conception and gestation of well-loved children by individuals who 
have no intention of raising them (i.e., donors and surrogates), they 
testify to the severability of biological and social parenthood. Insofar as 
reproductive technologies enable single and LGBT people to become 
parents, they subvert some of the same “hegemonic family forms” 
whose appeal, paradoxically, drives the fertility industry.51 And insofar 
as ARTs empower queer individuals to engineer non-coital meetings of 
sperm and egg, they impinge on a primary source of heterosexuality’s 
mystique and claim to moral superiority: its “exclusive monopoly” over 
the creation of new life.52 Moreover, by facilitating what is, in a sense, 
“same-sex procreation,” ARTs undermine a binary gender system 
premised largely on reproductive function.53 
Given reproductive technologies’ capacity to disrupt linked norms 
of gender, sexuality, and parenthood, it seems only fitting that 
proponents of LGBT equality would be at the forefront of efforts to 
facilitate access to them. Movement engagement with the issue began 
no later than the “gayby boom” of the 1980s,54 a phenomenon that itself 
had several political dimensions. First, the “boom” was spurred 
primarily by community efforts to circulate information about assisted 
(or “artificial”) insemination and to establish lesbian reproductive 
health clinics.55 These efforts were widely understood as end-runs 
around a medical establishment that was hesitant to provide fertility 
counseling and treatment to unmarried women, especially lesbians.56 
Second, intentional lesbian motherhood provoked significant intra-
community debate: was this a triumph of female reproductive autonomy 
or a capitulation to natalism and gender stereotypes?57 Third, the 
lesbian baby boom thrust movement lawyers into custody and visitation 
disputes involving women with donor-conceived children. Advocates’ 
consistent position in these cases, described at greater length below, 
was to defend the rights of nonbiological parents.58 
 
 51. CHARIS THOMPSON, MAKING PARENTS: THE ONTOLOGICAL 
CHOREOGRAPHY OF REPRODUCTIVE TECHNOLOGIES 274 (2005). 
 52. SUSAN MARTHA KAHN, REPRODUCING JEWS: A CULTURAL ACCOUNT OF 
ASSISTED CONCEPTION IN ISRAEL 102–03 (2000) (paraphrasing SARAH FRANKLIN, 
EMBODIED PROGRESS: A CULTURAL ACCOUNT OF ASSISTED CONCEPTION 165–66 
(1997)). 
 53. SULLIVAN, supra note 15, at 9–10. 
 54. By 1988, the lesbian “baby boom” was an “observable fact.” Stephanie 
Weissman, Lesbians Considering Parenthood 2 (May 1988) (Ph.D dissertation, 
Massachusetts School of Professional Psychology). 
 55. See, e.g., Renate Duelli Klein, Doing It Ourselves: Self-insemination, in 
TEST-TUBE WOMEN: WHAT FUTURE FOR MOTHERHOOD? 382 (Rita Arditti et al. eds., 
1984). 
 56. See id. at 383. 
 57. See generally Polikoff, supra note 38. 
 58. See infra notes 360–364 and accompanying text. 
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Then came the uproar over cloning, sparked by the birth of Dolly 
the sheep in 1996.59 Gay activists participated vigorously in public 
discussion of this groundbreaking but fearsome achievement.60 Some 
claimed that lesbians and gay men have a “special interest,” a unique 
“stake in the advancement of cloning technology.”61 When President 
Bill Clinton issued an executive order prohibiting the use of federal 
funds for human cloning research, Randy Wicker, a leading figure in 
the early gay liberation movement, founded the Clone Rights Action 
Network, which led a protest outside the Stonewall Inn in New York 
City.62 In an interview with Gay Today, Frank Kameny, the “‘father’ of 
gay activist militancy,”63 explained: “Because many gay men and 
women wish to have children of their own, and doing it ‘the old-
fashioned way’ is not to our liking, cloning . . . offer[s us] possibilities 
of particular interest and unique value . . . .”64 
Kameny’s statement on cloning neatly captures the logic that 
underlies many LGBT-equality arguments for expanding access to 
reproductive technologies. These arguments begin with the proposition 
that LGBT people are more likely than the general population to require 
procreative assistance because they suffer special forms of infertility: 
the medical infertility that many transgender people experience due to 
hormonal and/or anatomical interventions,65 and the “dysfertility”66—
 
 59. See generally Gina Kolata, Scientist Reports First Cloning Ever of Adult 
Mammal, N.Y. TIMES (Feb. 23, 1997), 
http://www.nytimes.com/1997/02/23/us/scientist-reports-first-cloning-ever-of-adult-
mammal.html [https://perma.cc/8593-PL7J]. 
 60. See John A. Robertson, Gay and Lesbian Access to Assisted Reproductive 
Technology, 55 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 323, 365 (2004) (noting that “persons in the gay 
and lesbian community were among the first proponents of cloning . . . .”). For a 
surprisingly early discussion of cloning among “potential future methods of female 
reproduction without men,” see Mary O’Donnell, Lesbian Health Care: Issues and 
Literature, 10 SCI. FOR PEOPLE 8, 14 (1978). 
 61. Chris Bull, Send in the Clones, ADVOCATE, Apr. 15, 1997, at 37.  
 62. Jack Nichols, First Cloning Rights Group Led by Gay Pioneer, GAY 
TODAY (Feb. 27, 1997), http://gaytoday.badpuppy.com/garchive/events/022897ev.htm 
[https://perma.cc/KG4J-E6GG] (quoting Randy Wicker, “Cloning is a Gay and 
Feminist Issue!”). 
 63. Jack Nichols, A Conversation with the Father of Gay Activist Militancy: 
Franklin Kameny, GAY TODAY (April 28, 1997), 
http://gaytoday.com/garchive/interview/042897in.htm [https://perma.cc/Z4TC-GTBG]. 
 64. One Take on Cloning: It Makes Men Irrelevant, ASSOCIATED PRESS (April 
7, 1997), http://lubbockonline.com/news/040797/columnis.htm 
[https://perma.cc/T2VM-STJZ]. For a thorough elaboration of the LGBT claim to a 
right to clone, see generally Erez Aloni, Cloning and the LGBTI Family, 35 N.Y.U. 
REV. L. & SOC. CHANGE 1 (2011). 
 65. Katrien Wierckx et al., Reproductive Wish in Transsexual Men, 27 HUM. 
REPROD. 483, 483 (2011) (noting that hormone treatments and sex reassignment 
surgery can “lead to an irreversible loss of . . . reproductive potential”). 
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also known as the “structural,”67 “relational,”68 or “constructive”69 
infertility—of lesbians and gay men and of bisexuals in same-sex 
relationships. Given these conditions, the argument goes, barriers to 
ART have a “disparate”—a “concentrated” or “lopsided”—impact on 
LGBT people,70 impeding full LGBT equality in parenthood. Therefore 
they are discriminatory. 
Relying on this logic, advocates have alleged that a wide variety of 
policies, practices, and proposals discriminate (or, if adopted, would 
discriminate) against the disproportionately “dysfertile” LGBT 
population. Activists, politicians, and academics seeking to enable 
LGBT parenthood have: 
• called for repeal of bans on surrogacy71 and opposed 
candidates who support those laws;72 
 
 66. Lisa C. Ikemoto, The In/Fertile, the Too Fertile, and the Dysfertile, 47 
HASTINGS L.J. 1007, 1033 (1996) (coining the term “dysfertile” to describe “those 
rendered childless by their failure to fit the definition of infertile, because they are 
unmarried and/or lesbian or gay”). 
 67. Daar, supra note 2, at 24 (discussing “structural” infertility). 
 68. Julien S. Murphy, Should Lesbians Count as Infertile Couples? 
Antilesbian Discrimination in Assisted Reproduction, in QUEER FAMILIES, QUEER 
POLITICS 182, 182–83 (Mary Bernstein & Renate Reimann eds., 2001) (discussing 
“relational infertility”). 
 69. Catherine DeLair, Ethical, Moral, Economic and Legal Barriers to 
Assisted Reproductive Technologies Employed by Gay Men and Lesbian Women, 4 
DEPAUL J. HEALTH CARE L. 147 (2000) (calling gays and lesbians “constructively 
infertile”). 
 70. For uses of these terms, see, in turn, Richard F. Storrow, Marital Status 
and Sexual Orientation Discrimination in Infertility Care, 3 L.J. SOC. JUST. 99, 108 
(2012); Stu Marvel, “Tony Danza Is My Sperm Donor?”: Queer Kinship and the 
Impact of Canadian Regulation Around Sperm Donation, 25 CAN. J. WOMEN & L. 221, 
238–39 (2013); Kimberly M. Mutcherson, The New Kinship is the Old Kinship (Dec. 
11, 2014) (unpublished manuscript) (on file with author). 
 71. See supra notes 8–14 and accompanying text (discussing efforts to repeal 
New York’s surrogacy ban); see also Kimberly M. Mutcherson, How Parents Are 
Made: A Response to Discrimination in Baby Making: The Unconstitutional Treatment 
of Prospective Parents Through Surrogacy, 88 IND. L.J. 1207, 1212–13 (2013) (“[T]he 
case for the unconstitutionality of marriage based restrictions on access to surrogacy . . 
. . might be strengthened by noting that such [restrictions] work a particular violence on 
. . . same-sex couples, especially gay men.”); Peter Nicolas, Straddling the Columbia: 
A Constitutional Law Professor’s Musings on Circumventing Washington State’s 
Criminal Prohibition on Compensated Surrogacy, 89 WASH. L. REV. 1235, 1238 (2014) 
(characterizing Washington’s criminal ban on surrogacy contracts as anomalous given 
the state’s “otherwise favorable legal atmosphere for same-sex couples”); Lou 
Chibbaro, Catania Introduces Surrogacy Bill, WASH. BLADE (Jan. 16, 2013), 
http://www.washingtonblade.com/2013/01/16/catania-introduces-surrogacy-bill/ 
[https://perma.cc/9WVG-N46Q] (noting the Gay and Lesbian Activists Alliance’s 
endorsement and other LGBT activists’ “praise” of a bill introduced by “[g]ay D.C. 
Council member David Catania” to legalize surrogacy in the District of Columbia). 
 72. See, e.g., Chris Christie: Opposes Nationwide Marriage Equality, 
Transgender Rights, HUMAN RIGHTS CAMPAIGN, 
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• demanded public funding of ART research;73 
• fought anti-abortion measures that encompass practices, 
such as “selective reduction,”74 that sometimes attend 
certain ARTs;75 
• charged that curtailing access to anonymously donated 
sperm reinforces “reproductive hierarchies” that 
disadvantage lesbian parenthood;76 
• protested the “dramatic impact” that bans on self-
insemination have on lesbians and single women;77 
• decried the “disproportionate effect” on LGBT people of 
regulations that permit gametes to be donated but not 
sold;78 
• called for legislation to compel insurance companies to 
cover procreative technologies;79 
• urged university administrators to qualify the costs of 
assisted procreation (as well as adoption) for “dependent 
care adjustments” of student loan debt;80 
 
http://www.hrc.org/2016RepublicanFacts/chris-christie [https://perma.cc/RM6Z-
TSFD] (last visited Oct. 16, 2016). 
 73. Aloni, supra note 64, at 62–76 (arguing that the federal ban on cloning 
research discriminates against LGBT and intersex people and violates equal protection).  
 74. “Selective reduction, also known as multifetal pregnancy reduction[,] . . .  
is the practice of terminating one or more fetuses to reduce a multiple pregnancy . . . .” 
Radhika Rao, Selective Reduction: “A Soft Cover for Hard Choices” or Another Name 
for Abortion?, 43 J.L. MED. ETHICS 196, 196 (2015). 
 75. See, e.g., Colorado and Mississippi—“Personhood” Amendments on 
November Ballots, PROUD PARENTING (Apr. 29, 2010), 
http://www.proudparenting.com/category/legal-financial/page/23/ 
[https://perma.cc/7WZS-W29C]; J.C. O’Connell, GLBT Issues Quiet but Powerful in 
Presidential Campaign, COLO. INDEP. (Sept. 26, 2008), 
http://www.coloradoindependent.com/9014/glbt-issues-quiet-but-powerful-in-
presidential-campaign [https://perma.cc/J4UQ-7AJC] (noting Equal Rights Colorado’s 
opposition to a proposed “Egg as a Person” Amendment due to its “impact on the use 
of [ARTs]”). 
 76. Mutcherson, supra note 70, at 13. See also Angela Cameron et al., De-
anonymising Sperm Donors in Canada, 26 CANADIAN J. FAM. L. 95, 116–30 (2010). 
 77. Storrow, supra note 70, at 110 (internal quotation omitted) (footnote 
omitted). 
 78. Marvel, supra note 70, at 229. 
 79. See Blake, supra note 2, at 701. See also Murphy, supra note 68, at 184–
85 (counting the high cost of fertility services as an instance of “antilesbian 
discrimination”). 
 80. E-mail from Sarah Gersten, Co-President, Harvard Law Sch. Lambda, to 
author (March 25, 2015, 7:49 AM) (on file with author) (describing an effort initiated 
by Harvard Law School’s LGBTQ group to “allow . . . LGBTQ and other couples who 
wish to adopt or utilize ART to be able to do so while pursuing a public interest 
career”). 
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• counted employers’ willingness to subsidize assisted 
procreation (but not adoption) as an indicator of solicitude 
toward LGBT employees;81 
• claimed that judicial non-enforcement of parenting 
contracts “takes a particular toll” on same-sex couples, 
who “must rely” on assisted procreation to have children;82 
• suggested that “centering the queer reproductive family” in 
legal and political debates about ART could furnish 
grounds to “demand access to state-led subsidies;”83 and 
• argued that “facially neutral” restrictions on fertility 
tourism,84 along with “immigration policies that restrict 
recognition of children born of surrogacy,” unfairly 
obstruct “the creation of families headed by gay and 
lesbian or single parents.”85 
To be sure, not all LGBT-equality claims about assisted 
procreation relate to disparate impacts. Some involve relatively 
straightforward cases of disparate treatment. A number of foreign 
countries permit only married or heterosexual couples to access 
ARTs.86 In the United States, disparate-treatment discrimination against 
LGBT people takes multiple forms: outright refusals of medical 
treatment (an increasingly rare problem in a profit-driven industry 
whose ethical guidelines prohibit discrimination based on marital status 
and sexual orientation);87 LGBT marginalization in the information and 
treatment offered by otherwise nondiscriminatory ART providers;88 
 
 81. See NAT’L LGBT BAR ASS’N, 2015 LAVENDER LAW CONFERENCE & 
CAREER FAIR 40–45 (2015) (Conference Program).  
 82. Kaiponanea T. Matsumura, Public Policing of Intimate Agreements, 25 
YALE J.L. & FEMINISM 159, 165 (2013) (emphasis added). 
 83. Marvel, supra note 2, at 301–02, 310. 
 84. Fertility tourism is a sub-species of medical tourism, which is defined as 
“the travel of patients from the ‘home country’ to the ‘destination country’ for medical 
treatment . . . .” I. Glenn Cohen, Circumvention Tourism, 97 CORNELL L. REV. 1309, 
1311 (2013). Legal restrictions and international price disparities “have prompted 
significant amounts of [fertility] tourism.” Id. at 1323. 
 85. Storrow, supra note 70, at 108.  
 86. Id. at 101. 
 87. See Am. Coll. of Obstetricians & Gynecologists Comm., Opinion No. 
385: The Limits of Conscientious Refusal in Reproductive Medicine, 110 OBSTETRICS & 
GYNECOLOGY 1203, 1206 (2007) (condemning discrimination based on sexual 
orientation); The Ethics Comm. of the Am. Soc’y for Reprod. Med., Access to Fertility 
Treatment by Gays, Lesbians, and Unmarried Persons, 100 FERTILITY & STERILITY 
1524, 1526 (2013) (condemning discrimination against “single persons and gay and 
lesbian couples”). 
 88. Lori E. Ross et al., Sexual and Gender Minority Peoples’ 
Recommendations for Assisted Human Reproduction Services, 36 J. OBSTETRICS & 
GYNECOLOGY CAN. 146, 148, 150 (2014) (describing comments, questions, forms, 
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insurance policies and statutory insurance mandates that employ a 
“narrow and heterocentric definition of infertility;”89 and refusals to 
apply the marital paternity presumption to nonbiological mothers in 
same-sex unions.90 
Finally, proponents of LGBT parenthood contend that barriers to 
ART infringe the right to procreate,91 the “right to found a family,”92 in 
violation of constitutional and international law.93 Such claims are 
regularly yoked to equality arguments, the idea being that LGBT 
people’s unequal access to biological parenthood (or to a particular 
route to biological parenthood) discriminates against them in their 
exercise of a fundamental right.94 These claims target disparate 
treatments, like the hypothetical Preservation of Family Values Act 
(PFVA) that President (then-Professor) Barack Obama asked students to 
analyze in a 1996 law-school exam;95 and they target disparate impacts, 
 
brochures, and websites that “presume heterosexuality, cisgender identities, or 
particular family configurations”). 
 89. Storrow, supra note 70, at 100; see also Second Amended Complaint, 
supra note 6, at 3, 18 (alleging that a state insurance mandate defining infertility by 
reference two years of unprotected heterosexual intercourse violates the Equal 
Protection Clause).  
 90. See Gartner v. Iowa Dep’t of Pub. Health, 830 N.W.2d 335 (2013) 
(holding that the Iowa Constitution’s equal protection guarantee requires the marital 
presumption’s application to same-sex couples). 
 91. See, e.g., S.J. Barrett, For the Sake of the Children: A New Approach to 
Securing Same-Sex Marriage Rights?, 73 BROOK. L. REV. 695, 714 (2008) (arguing 
that “homosexual parents” are entitled under the right to procreate “to give birth [sic] 
via artificial insemination or otherwise”). 
 92. Matthew Vella, IVF Law ‘Inherently Homophobic’ – Gay Rights 
Movement, MALTATODAY (July 31, 2012), 
http://www.maltatoday.com.mt/news/national/19981/ivf-law-inherently-homophobic-
gay-rights-movement-20120731#.V-vN7dz897K [https://perma.cc/6LSS-C8TC] 
(describing a Maltese advocate’s reaction to a regulation that would restrict IVF to 
different-sex couples). See also Diane S. Hinson, Ask the Expert, 38 FAM. ADVOC. 42, 
42 (2016) (arguing that Obergefell bolsters same-sex couples’ “right to build their 
families”). 
 93. See infra note 317 and accompanying text.  
 94. See NeJaime, supra note 5, at 347 (“ART, as an acceptable and available 
mode of family formation, is essential to sexual orientation equality and to same-sex 
couples’ procreative liberty.”). 
 95. The hypothetical Act prohibited “health care professional[s] . . . from 
providing infertility services to any unmarried person” and further provided that, if 
found unconstitutional, the prohibition would “apply only to . . . homosexual couples.” 
Barack Obama, Constitutional Law III Final Examination, at 1–2 (Dec. 12, 1996), 
http://lawprofessors.typepad.com/files/conlaw3.obama.1996.fall.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/2VNH-YW3Q]. According to Obama’s answer key, “[a]t first blush, 
the [Act] seems clearly to implicate . . . the right to procreate first announced in 
Skinner v. Oklahoma.” Barack Obama, Re: The Exam, at 2 [hereinafter Exam Key], 
http://lawprofessors.typepad.com/files/conlaw3.obama.1996.fall.memo.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/8XGL-97VJ]; see also Jodi Kantor, Teaching Law, Testing Ideas, 
Obama Stood Slightly Apart, N.Y. TIMES (July 30, 2008), 
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like bans on compensated surrogacy and “[l]aws that . . . deny . . . 
recognition to intended parents . . . .”96 
As Professor Obama observed in his own constitutional assessment 
of the PFVA, “the status and scope of the ‘procreation right’” are 
“unsettled.”97 Expert opinion is divided even as to whether the right 
extends from “natural” to assisted procreation.98 Still, “rights talk” 
about reproductive technologies furnishes enviable rhetorical 
opportunities. Claims in this vein range from the broad assertion that, 
without access to ARTs, “no gay person would be able to exercise 
biological kinship or reproducti[ve] rights,”99 to the arresting 
suggestion that, “[f]rom the standpoint of a couple whose only hope of 
procreating is through the assistance of a surrogate, a law that 
criminalizes that assistance is no different than [a] law providing for the 




 96. NeJaime, supra note 5, at 347; see also Kristine S. Knaplund, Children of 
Assisted Reproduction, 45 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 899, 930 (2012) (suggesting that 
“refusal to allow the use of ART or to enforce [a] gestational agreement could 
implicate” married couples’ right to procreate and arguing that this right should extend 
to married same-sex couples). 
 97. Obama, Exam Key, supra note 95, at 3. For a fuller discussion of the right 
to procreate in American jurisprudence, see infra Part IV.B. 
 98. For a range of opinions on the question, see JOHN A. ROBERTSON, 
CHILDREN OF CHOICE: FREEDOM AND THE NEW REPRODUCTIVE TECHNOLOGIES (1994) 
(arguing that the right to procreate includes a right to use ARTs); I. Glenn Cohen, The 
Constitution and the Rights Not to Procreate, 60 STAN. L. REV. 1135, 1195, n.244 
(expressing doubts as to Skinner v. Oklahoma ex rel. Williamson’s relevance to 
restrictions on ART); Garrison, infra note 285, at 859 (suggesting that the “murky” 
“boundaries of procreative liberty . . . [render] ‘rights talk’ . . . [about ART unhelpful 
in] fashioning a workable legal regime”); Kimberly M. Mutcherson, Procreative 
Pluralism, 30 BERKELEY J. GENDER L. & JUST. 22, 22 (2015) (claiming that the right to 
procreate not only includes an entitlement to use ARTs but may also impose on states 
“positive obligations to provide some people with access to [ARTs]”); Radhika Rao, 
Equal Liberty: Assisted Reproductive Technology and Reproductive Equality, 76 GEO. 
WASH. L. REV. 1457, 1460 (2008) (concluding that “there is no general right to use 
ARTs as a matter of reproductive autonomy, but there may be a limited right to use 
ARTs as a matter of reproductive equality”); Cass R. Sunstein, Is There a 
Constitutional Right to Clone?, 53 HASTINGS L.J. 987, 989–92 (2002) (asserting that it 
is constitutional to ban any and all ARTs). 
 99. SULLIVAN, supra note 15, at 11. 
 100. Nicolas, supra note 71, at 1281. The reference here is to Skinner v. 
Oklahoma ex rel. Williamson, 316 U.S. 535, 537–38 (1942), where the Supreme Court 
held that Oklahoma violated the Equal Protection Clause by sterilizing only certain 
classes of felon. For other invocations of sterilization laws in the context of ART 
regulation, see Daar, supra note 2, at 81 (suggesting that “barriers to ART access” are 
“deprivation[s] of reproductive opportunity just as coercive as any formal, explicit 
directive to forgo offspring”); Mutcherson, supra note 98, at 51 (“[P]lacing the ability 
to deny access to fertility treatment in the hands of the state is akin to giving the state 
the ability to sterilize.”). 
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LGBT-rights advocates thus resort to three main classes of 
argument with regard to barriers to ART: allegations of disparate-
treatment discrimination, allegations of disparate-impact discrimination, 
and appeals to procreative freedom. They press these grievances in 
legal and non-legal settings against a varied and growing range of 
targets. And they do so on behalf of a constituency whose appetite for 
procreative technologies is only likely to grow in the present age of 
marriage equality.101 The following Part describes the nature of that 
appetite. 
II. BIOGENETICISM IN LGBT PROCREATION 
LGBT people constitute a substantial share of the market for 
assisted reproductive technologies.102 Research from Canada indicates 
that they represent up to twenty-five percent of clients at urban fertility 
clinics and that most users of donor sperm are “lesbian-identified.”103 
Anecdotal evidence suggests that, in some areas, gay male couples 
constitute a similarly large share of the gestational surrogacy market.104 
What accounts for these trends? Why choose to bear offspring 
rather than adopt? Later in this Article we will see how prospective 
parents are influenced by regulatory and economic structures that make 
adoption a daunting prospect.105 The present Part focuses on the 
biogeneticist ideology that underlies some of those structures and that 
directly shapes individuals’ decisions about whether and how to employ 
ARTs. It shows that many LGBT procreators “adhere to definitions of 
family” and of coupledom that are, in a word, “reproductive.”106 
 
 101. “[C]hildren are often associated with marriage, and those who marry often 
want to have children. In that sense it is likely that [legal recognition of same-sex 
marriage] has increased demand for surrogacy services.” Martha A. Field, 
Compensated Surrogacy, 89 WASH. L. REV. 1155, 1169 (2014). See also More Gay 
Men “Married With Children,” CBSNEWS (Aug. 11, 2008, 11:06 AM), 
http://www.cbsnews.com/news/more-gay-men-married-with-children/ 
[https://perma.cc/5YE6-R4ET] (noting a positive correlation between the legalization of 
same-sex marriage and gay men’s inquiries with surrogacy agencies). 
 102. LAURA MAMO, QUEERING REPRODUCTION 221 (2007) (“[L]esbians are a 
primary niche market for sperm banks and fertility services . . . .”).  
 103. See RACHEL EPSTEIN, SHERBOURNE HEALTH CTR., THE ASSISTED HUMAN 
REPRODUCTION ACT AND LGBTQ COMMUNITIES (2008); Marvel, supra note 70, at 232. 
 104. Kari Lydersen, Make Room for Daddies: Surrogate Demand Grows, 
CRAIN’S CHI. BUS. (Feb. 2, 2013), 
http://www.chicagobusiness.com/article/20130202/ISSUE03/302029981/make-room-
for-daddies-surrogate-demand-grows [https://perma.cc/DE6T-9K5Z] (citing two 
surrogacy facilitators in Chicago who say that “[g]ay couples typically make up more 
than half their clients”). 
 105. See infra Part IV.A. 
 106. ELLEN LEWIN, GAY FATHERHOOD: NARRATIVES OF FAMILY AND 
CITIZENSHIP IN AMERICA 120–21 (2009). 
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A. Desire for Offspring 
At the most basic level, of course, people use ARTs because they 
want children—which “almost always” means “children who will be 
genetically related to them or to their partner and . . . who will have 
‘good genes.’”107 The existence of a genetic tie is “the most oft-cited 
reason that gay men choose surrogacy,”108 and the prospects of 
“pregnancy, birth, and a desired genetic link”—all modes of biological 
relationship—are lesbians’ most common reasons for choosing assisted 
insemination over adoption.109 This longing for offspring is hardly less 
powerful for the fact that, in the present state of medicine, only one 
half of a same-sex pair can be the genetic parent of a baby the two plan 
together. As one lesbian couple put it: “we realized . . . we could have 
at least one of us in our children, rather than . . . none of us in our 
children.”110 
With remarkable rhetorical consistency, LGBT and non-LGBT 
people alike speak of a “human desire for a child of one’s own flesh 
and blood,”111 a “natural inclination to reproduce” that we possess “as 
human beings.”112 Although this “simple human urge” is generally 
thought to “require[] no special explanation,”113 some prospective 
parents cite an evolutionary compulsion to carry on their genes, an 
inherent craving for “immortality,”114 a need to “cheat[] death of its 
 
 107. CAHN, supra note 18, at 49; see also KARÍN LESNIK-OBERSTEIN, ON 
HAVING AN OWN CHILD xii (2008) (calling the preference “for an ‘own,’ ‘biological’ 
child . . . the single underpinning motivation and justification for [ART use]”). 
 108. Dana Berkowitz, Gay Men and Surrogacy, in LGBT-PARENT FAMILIES: 
INNOVATIONS IN RESEARCH AND IMPLICATIONS FOR PRACTICE 71, 76 (Abbie E. 
Goldberg & Katherine R. Allen eds., 2013). 
 109. See Jennifer M. Chabot & Barbara D. Ames, “It Wasn’t ‘Let’s Get 
Pregnant and Go Do It’:” Decision Making in Lesbian Couples Planning Motherhood 
via Donor Insemination, 53 FAM. REL. 348, 352 (2004). 
 110. SULLIVAN, supra note 15, at 44 (emphasis omitted). 
 111. Theresa Pinto Sherer, Can Two Men Make a Baby?, SALON (Jan. 31, 
2001, 2:19 PM) (quoting Felicia Park-Rogers, Director of Children of Lesbians and 
Gays Everywhere), http://www.salon.com/2001/01/31/eggs_2/ 
[https://perma.cc/H6X6-BW3Z]. 
 112. Daar, supra note 2, at 76 (calling biological parenthood “the most basic of 
human activities”); see also Nicolas, supra note 71, at 1309 (calling the desire to 
reproduce “an innate part of human nature”). 
 113. LEWIN, supra note 106, at 182 (describing the perspective of certain gay 
fathers). 
 114. Berkowitz, supra note 108, at 75 (discussing findings that both “gay . . . 
and heterosexual men . . . cite . . . the achievement of some sense of immortality 
through children” as a reason to become a parent); ABBIE E. GOLDBERG, GAY DADS: 
TRANSITIONS TO ADOPTIVE FATHERHOOD 26 (2012) (quoting a gay father for whom 
adoption was “initially difficult” because he wanted a child to “serve [his] immortality 
element” by “continuing [his] genes”). 
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finality.”115 Others feel a duty to extend their “ancestral line” or profess 
the superiority of their particular genetic heritage.116 
Again, LGBT ART users are not so different in these respects 
from their straight counterparts. It is regularly observed (as if the point 
were obviously reassuring) that LGBT people want children for “pretty 
much the same reasons” as non-LGBT people.117 Yet some of these 
common interests may be stronger, or may carry particular inflections, 
if one is queer. The prospect of “physical and emotional support, 
especially in old age,” hits a sensitive nerve among individuals 
terrorized by “the hackneyed image of ‘the older homosexual,’ . . . 
alienated from relatives and living out his or her last years alone.”118 
So, too, does parenthood’s promise of “maturity,”119 
“respectability,”120 “normalcy,”121 and “acceptance.”122 For many 
people, having children means “becoming fully adult,”123 “prov[ing] to 
oneself and to others one’s independence and maturity.”124 It means 
attaining “community stature” and “a kind of cultural recognition,” 
including social intelligibility as family, “not otherwise available.”125 
 
 115. Joan Raphael-Leff, Eros and ART, in INCONCEIVABLE CONCEPTIONS: 
PSYCHOLOGICAL ASPECTS OF INFERTILITY AND REPRODUCTIVE TECHNOLOGY 35, 36–37 
(Janet Haynes & Juliet Miller eds., 2003) (listing reasons why her patients desired 
children). 
 116. Aloni, supra note 64, at 9; KAHN, supra note 52, at 20; see also Joan 
Mahoney, Adoption as a Feminist Alternative to Reproductive Technology, in 
REPRODUCTION, ETHICS, AND THE LAW: FEMINIST PERSPECTIVES 49–50 (Joan C. 
Callahan ed., 1995) (describing people who “believe that intelligence and personality 
are largely hereditary” and who prefer ART over adoption because they “believe[] they 
have good genes” in those respects). 
 117. William N. Eskridge, Jr. & Edward Stein, Queer Clones, in CLONES AND 
CLONES: FACTS AND FANTASIES ABOUT HUMAN CLONING 95, 103 (Martha C. Nussbaum 
& Cass R. Sunstein eds., 1998); see also Ethics Comm. of the Am. Soc’y for Reprod. 
Med., supra note 87, at 1525 (attributing to “gays and lesbians . . . the same reasons . 
. . that motivate reproduction generally”); Robertson, supra note 60, at 326 (“[G]ays 
and lesbians have the same interests in reproducing as do heterosexuals . . . .”). 
 118. KATH WESTON, FAMILIES WE CHOOSE: LESBIANS, GAYS, AND KINSHIP 2, 
22–23 (1991).  
 119. “Most people grow up simply assuming . . . that maturity includes 
‘settling down and raising a family.’” Shelley M. Park, Is Queer Parenting Possible?, 
in WHO’S YOUR DADDY? AND OTHER WRITINGS ON QUEER PARENTING 316, 318 (Rachel 
Epstein ed., 2009). 
 120. ELLEN LEWIN, LESBIAN MOTHERS: ACCOUNTS OF GENDER IN AMERICAN 
CULTURE 192 (1998); MAMO, supra note 102, at 88. 
 121. MAMO, supra note 102, at 88. 
 122. Alexis Jetter, Lesbian Baby Boom, HARPER’S BAZAAR, Oct. 1996, at 66. 
 123. Raphael-Leff, supra note 115, at 38 (noting that becoming a parent signals 
“maturational growth”).  
 124. Kenneth D. Alpern, Genetic Puzzles and Stork Stories: On the Meaning 
and Significance of Having Children, in THE ETHICS OF REPRODUCTIVE TECHNOLOGY 
151 (Kenneth Alpern ed. 1992). 
 125. LEWIN, supra note 106, at 48. 
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Such rewards might carry “special resonance” for members of a 
community “often seen to be immature and irresponsible,”126 for 
persons scarred by social stigma and moral disapproval,127 for couples 
whose bonds, long denied legal recognition, are still widely 
denigrated,128 and for psyches harboring shame and guilt over 
sexualities that powerful voices condemn as “intrinsically 
disordered.”129 
Other “parenthood motives” fit the same pattern: they often but 
need not have a biogenetic cast, and this biogenetic cast may weigh 
differently on LGBT people than it does on non-LGBT people. Take 
the wish to please family members, especially would-be grandparents, 
by having a baby. On the one hand, a presumption of biogenetic 
continuity is often implicit in the plea for grandchildren;130 on the other, 
a desire to placate Mom and Dad by extending their lineage may be 
especially strong for individuals whose queerness has estranged them 
from families of origin,131 whose romantic partnerships are taken less 
seriously by those families,132 and whose coming-outs provoked 
mourning for the descendants who would never be.133 
 
 126. Id. at 121; see also Alison Shonkwiler, The Selfish-Enough Father: Gay 
Adoption and the Late-Capitalist Family, 14 GLQ: J. LESBIAN & GAY STUD. 537, 557 
(2008) (remarking how the assertion of “maturity through parenthood specifically 
counteracts the standard narrative of homosexuality as a failure to develop a fully adult 
sexual identity”). 
 127. Obergefell v. Hodges, 135 S. Ct. 2584, 2604 (2015) (observing that a 
history of criminalization and disapproval deepened the harm of same-sex couples’ 
inequality in marriage). 
 128. “[B]ecause gay men are often denied ceremonial and legal recognition of 
their families, the presence of a genetic link can be a meaningful symbol that validates 
their relationship to their child.” Berkowitz, supra note 108, at 76. 
 129. CATECHISM OF THE CATHOLIC CHURCH 566 (2d ed. 2003) (describing 
“homosexual acts” as “contrary to the natural law. . . . [because t]hey close the sexual 
act to the gift of life”); see also Stephen Dunne, I Was a Closet Queer Sperm Donor, in 
BEYOND BLOOD: WRITINGS ON THE LESBIAN AND GAY FAMILY 97, 100 (Louise 
Wakeling & Margaret Bradstock eds., 1995) (suggesting that “the wonders of science” 
create the exculpatory possibility of “surpass[ing one’s] supposed non-reproductive bent 
. . . . [and] perform[ing one’s] duty to the species”). 
 130. See SULLIVAN, supra note 15, at 128 (describing parents who want 
grandchildren “from the same blood . . . that pulses through their own bodies”); 
Berkowitz, supra note 108, at 77 (summarizing a number of studies that reach the same 
finding).  
 131. “[H]aving children . . . can open up and enrich connections to one’s blood 
relations. Even reluctant grandparents—those who have long histories of homophobia . 
. . —seem to rise to the occasion when actual grandchildren make their appearance.” 
LEWIN, supra note 106, at 122.  
 132. “Blood relatives are much more likely to ‘come around’ [to an existing 
lesbian family] with the birth of a child with whom they have a perceived biogenetic 
connection.” SULLIVAN, supra note 15, at 133–34. 
 133. John Leland, O.K., You’re Gay. So? Where’s My Grandchild?, N.Y. 
TIMES (Dec. 21, 2000), http://www.nytimes.com/2000/12/21/garden/ok-you-re-gay-so-
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Or take the goal of “gender realization” that informs many hopes 
of becoming a mother or father.134 On the one hand, parenthood may 
not fully achieve this purpose if it does not also attest to a person’s 
virility, fecundity, or capacities for pregnancy and childbirth;135 on the 
other, the appeal of such proof, the underlying need to shore up a 
gender identity, might be more acute when the mere fact of being L, G, 
B, or T makes that identity unusually vulnerable to challenge.136 As 
bioethicist Timothy Murphy observes of some transgender women’s 
interest in having a uterus transplant, gestation—or just the fact of 
having a womb—“can play a key role in expressing and consolidating a 
female identity.”137 
And then there are the many “parenthood motives” that have little 
or no special relevance to LGBT people but that often do mask 
biogenetic presumptions in an ostensibly biology-neutral terms. We find 
several such motives on philosopher Kenneth Alpern’s list of 
“important and commonly given reasons” for having children: 
 
where-s-my-grandchild.html [https://perma.cc/V3DE-CGYC] (describing “[p]arents 
who once resigned themselves, however painfully, to what they assumed would be a 
life without grandchildren” and who are now pushing their sons and daughters to use 
ARTs).  
 134. Alpern, supra note 124, at 151–52; see also FRANKLIN, supra note 18, at 
226 (“[H]aving children is . . . closely correlated with the successful achievement of 
adult gender identities.”). 
 135. FRANKLIN, supra note 18, at 212 (describing women who “attempt IVF in 
order to . . . confirm a gender identity”); see also Raphael-Leff, supra note 115, at 42 
(“For some people . . . the desperate wish to conceive represents . . . [a] desire to be 
pregnant, or even just a need for evidence of fertility.”). 
 136. There are several reasons, when it comes to parenthood, why this need 
exerts itself more forcefully among women. First, women are “taught from birth that 
their identities are inextricably linked with their capacity for pregnancy and childbirth.” 
ELIZABETH BARTHOLET, FAMILY BONDS: ADOPTION AND POLITICS OF PARENTING 35 
(1993). Second, many women celebrate pregnancy as “a remarkable natural process, . . 
. unlike any other” and in turn embrace reproductive labor as “empowering,” 
especially when undertaken with minimal male involvement. Barbara J. Berg, Listening 
to Voices of the Infertile, in REPRODUCTION, ETHNICS, AND THE LAW: FEMINIST 
PERSPECTIVES 80, 83–84 (Joan C. Callahan ed., 1995); Charlotte Witt, Family 
Resemblances: Adoption, Personal Identity, and Genetic Essentialism, in ADOPTION 
MATTERS 135, 136 (Sally Haslanger & Charlotte Witt eds., 2005). Third, for some 
women, lesbianism is a form, indeed the apotheosis, of “woman-identification.” See 
MARC STEIN, CITY OF SISTERLY AND BROTHERLY LOVES 353 (2000) (noting members of 
Radicalesbians, an organization best known for the manifesto The Woman Identified 
Woman (1970), who “signaled that they were woman-identified by highlighting their 
roles as mothers”). 
 137. Timothy F. Murphy, Assisted Gestation and Transgender Women, 29 
BIOETHICS 389, 392 & n.26 (2015) (recalling a transgender acquaintance who wished 
for a womb transfer “just for its own sake, not as a way to have (more) children”); see 
also Leah Samuel, With Womb Transplants a Reality, Transgender Women Dare to 
Dream of Pregnancies, STAT (Mar. 7, 2016), 
https://www.statnews.com/2016/03/07/uterine-transplant-transgender/ 
[https://perma.cc/M2RT-RPJG]. 
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(1) because children furnish opportunities for “specially 
intimate relationships of mutual knowledge, care, and 
dependence.”138 
 
Notwithstanding studies showing that adoptive parents are as close 
to their children as birth parents,139 some people feel that the “specially 
intimate relationship” one has with a child would be severely 
compromised or altogether impossible with a genetic stranger.140 In the 
first comprehensive survey of Americans’ attitudes regarding adoption, 
fully a quarter did not believe “that adoptive parents love their children 
as much as they would have loved their biological children.”141 
 
(2) because children “are interesting, rewarding, challenging, 
and fulfilling . . . .”142 
 
Less than sixty percent of Americans think that “adoptive parents 
receive the same amount of satisfaction from raising an adoptive child 
as from raising a biological child.”143 This is partly because, for certain 
parents, some of the most “interesting” and “fulfilling” things about 
children are physical, temperamental, and behavioral resemblances to 




 138. Alpern, supra note 124, at 151–52, 157. 
 139. See PETER L. BENSON ET AL., GROWING UP ADOPTED 22 (1994); SUZANNE 
M. JOHNSON & ELIZABETH O’CONNOR, THE GAY BABY BOOM: THE PSYCHOLOGY OF 
GAY PARENTHOOD 27–28 (2002) (citing Leslie Singer et al., Mother-Infant Attachment 
in Adoptive Families, 56 CHILD DEV. 1543, 1547 (1985)). 
 140. See Brenda Almond, Family Relationships and Reproductive Technology, 
in HAVING AND RAISING CHILDREN 103, 109–10 (Uma Narayan & Julia J. Bartkowiak 
eds., 1999) (questioning “the quality of care that can be relied on where purely social 
connections are involved”); Berg, supra note 136, at 82 (noting that adoptive parents 
lack an “automatic connection or linkage to their child. . . . [and] must be able to love 
a child who does not represent an extension of their own bodies and genetic lineages . . 
. ”). 
 141. Introduction, supra note 17, at 3. 
 142. Alpern, supra note 124, at 151. 
 143. Introduction, supra note 17, at 3. 
 144. “When a child is born there is often an intensive search, by biological 
parents and those around them, for the characteristics in the child which most resemble 
each parent (e.g., he has his mother’s hair or temperament; she’s tall or stubborn or 
bright[,] just like her father).” Berg, supra note 136, at 82; see also Rosenblum, supra 
note 38, at 210 (describing the author’s “attention and even delight in seeing kids with 
their parents and noting similarities and differences in phenotype” and his “curiosity to 
experience this connection” by having his own child). 
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(3) because children are “a vehicle . . . of conspicuous 
consumption . . . .”145 
 
Whether biological or adoptive, children may well be “the ultimate 
consumer item” in American culture.146 But if the success of 
conspicuous consumption depends upon “the quality of the goods 
consumed,” whose excellence is “evidence of wealth,”147 the bespoke 
products of ART usually will be more efficacious status symbols than 
“leftovers” procured through adoption.148 Certain ARTs, moreover, not 
only require “huge sums of money, but also a privileged lifestyle that 
permits devotion to . . . arduous [medical] process[es] . . . and often 
multiple attempts” at childbearing.149 
 
(4) because having children is “a cultural norm” so firmly 
“expected by parents [and] peers” that some people pursue 
parenthood “merely to fit in.”150 
 
Where the cultural norm of parenthood is essentially biogenetic,151 
adoption may be less effective than procreation in facilitating successful 
peer “bonding.”152 It certainly cannot induct one into “the sisterhood of 
women who have experienced pregnancy and childbirth.”153 
 
(5) because parenthood “contributes to the perpetuation and 
advancement of . . . one’s ethnic group . . . .”154 
 
Having a child will not satisfy this goal if one, or one’s ethnic 
community, understands group identity primarily or even partly in 
terms of blood.155 
 
 145. Alpern, supra note 124, at 157. 
 146. DAN SAVAGE, THE KID 13 (1999). 
 147. THORSTEIN VEBLEN, THE THEORY OF THE LEISURE CLASS 52–53 (Martha 
Banta ed., Oxford University Press 2007) (1899). 
 148. DUNCAN LINDSEY, THE WELFARE OF CHILDREN 16 (1994) (describing a 
“grudging” perspective on child welfare that sees “abandoned or orphaned children . . . 
[as] ‘leftovers’ . . . who had fallen beyond the economic and social pale”).  
 149. Dorothy E. Roberts, Race and the New Reproduction, 47 HASTINGS L.J. 
935, 940 (1996).  
 150. Alpern, supra note 124, at 151, 157. 
 151. See supra Part II. 
 152. Berg, supra note 136, at 84. 
 153. Id. at 83–84. 
 154. Alpern, supra note 124, at 152. 
 155. See WESTON, supra note 118, at 35–36 (observing that study participants 
who believed that “blood ties represent the only authentic, legitimate form of kinship. . 
. . [were often those] whose notions of kinship were bound up with their own sense of 
racial or ethnic identity”). 
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In short, many of the most prevalent reasons for having children 
refer, either on their face or on closer inspection, to biological children 
specifically. To the extent that LGBT people share those reasons—and 
many do—they go far in explaining ARTs’ popularity within this 
community and, in turn, ARTs’ growing prominence as a concern of 
LGBT politics. 
B. Romantic Reproduction 
For many couples, having a child “gives significance to the[ir] . . .  
personal relationship.”156 To some extent, this fact simply underscores 
the dominance of the notion that a “married couple without children 
does not quite make a family.”157 It also points to parenthood’s 
significance in the ideology of romantic and especially marital love.158 
If the institution of marriage has long served as a mechanism for 
binding parents to children, the institution of parenthood increasingly 
operates to bind two adults to each other, sometimes functioning in 
place of marriage.159 
Both biological and adoptive parenthood can declare and deepen “a 
commitment to having a future.”160 But procreation is to most minds—
well—sexier. In the case of fertile heterosexual couples, the reasons are 
clear enough. Conceiving “naturally” effects a double merger with 
one’s partner: merger in intercourse and merger in the resultant 
offspring.161 For same-sex couples, of course, “transcending 
separateness through the child born of sexual union” is still an 
unattainable feat.162 Nevertheless, many “dream[] of having biological 
 
 156. Alpern, supra note 124, at 151–52, 157. 
 157. SCHNEIDER, supra note 17, at 33; see also LEHR, supra note 1, at 65–67 
(noting three studies in which “[o]ne point often made by . . . lesbian mothers . . . 
[was] that in order for a family to be complete, it is necessary that a couple have 
children”). 
 158. CORINNE MAIER, NO KIDS 4 (Patrick Watson trans., 2007) (“[H]aving a 
baby . . . . is the outward and visible sign of a couple’s success . . . .”). 
 159. See Dan Savage, The Baby, N.Y. TIMES MAG. (Nov. 15, 1998), at 95 
(describing parenthood’s symbolism for him and his same-sex partner). 
 160. Id. 
 161. In American kinship ideology, “love in the sense of sexual intercourse . . 
. stands for [a] unity. . . . not only affirmed in the embrace, but also in the outcome of 
that union, the unity of blood, the child. . . . [who] unifies in one person the different 
biogenetic substances of both parents.” SCHNEIDER, supra note 17, at 39. 
 162. Leon R. Kass, The Meaning of Life—in the Laboratory, 146 PUB. INT. 59 
(1992) (stressing that only “the complementarity of gender provides [the] bodily 
means” for this transcendence). 
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children” together,163 and many do their utmost to approximate that 
ideal.164 
Some lesbians and bisexual women choose to gestate the fertilized 
egg of one partner in the womb of the other.165 One couple described 
this possibility as in vitro fertilization’s “biggest benefit,” because the 
baby is then truly “a child of the pair of us,” a baby “we both make 
and grow.”166 Couples who choose in vivo insemination can simulate a 
“natural” and “intimate” procreation in the bedroom or even at the 
doctor’s office.167 While the opportunity for “music, candles, pillows, 
and . . . sexual intimacy” makes at-home insemination the preferred 
method for some, “it is not unusual to hear about romance” in more 
clinical contexts,168 where both partners’ participation at the scene of 
conception enables them (and their future child) to impute “generative 
power” to the non-biological parent.169 Such co-creation narratives can 
be woven even in the absence of one party’s direct involvement at the 
scene of fertilization. Professor Julie Crawford writes:  
While I was neither a genetic nor a gestational mother, . . . I 
was, in a very real sense . . . a procreator[,] one who . . . 
‘brings into existence, who gives rise to.’ My partner and I 
chose to have a child together, and we chose the sperm 
provider . . . together.170 
Equally illustrative is the widespread practice of “donor 
matching,” whereby a gamete provider is “chosen for characteristics 
that . . . the couple believes will capture the [co-parent’s] ethnic and 
 
 163. J. Lester Feder, What Would You Do to Become a Father?, BUZZFEED 
(Mar. 22, 2013, 8:59 AM), http://www.buzzfeed.com/lesterfeder/what-would-you-do-
to-become-a-father [https://perma.cc/987P-GLMM] (quoting a gay man who had twins 
with his husband through surrogacy); see also Andrew Sullivan, What You Do, in 
SAME-SEX MARRIAGE PRO AND CON: A READER 81, 83 (Andrew Sullivan ed., 1997) 
(arguing that, like infertile heterosexual couples, same-sex couples “may . . . long to 
have unitive and procreative sex”). 
 164. Suzanne Pelka, The Making and Unmaking of Biological Ties in Lesbian-
Led Families, in WHO’S YOUR DADDY?: AND OTHER WRITINGS ON QUEER PARENTING 
13, 85 (Rachel Epstein ed., 2009) (finding that an “overwhelming, romantic desire to  . 
. . create children together” spurs many of the author’s LGBT clients to choose 
procreation over adoption). 
 165. Id. at 85. 
 166. Id. at 86. 
 167. MAMO, supra note 102, at 146; Chabot & Ames, supra note 109, at 352.  
 168. MAMO, supra note 102, at 145.  
 169. Hayden, supra note 24, at 51. 
 170. Julie Crawford, On Non-Biological Maternity, or “My Daughter is Going 
to Be a Father!”, in FAMILY-MAKING: CONTEMPORARY ETHICAL CHALLENGES 168, 171 
(Françoise Baylis & Carolyn McLeod eds., 2014) (internal citation omitted). 
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genetic heritage.”171 Race, which may well be, “[i]n this society, . . . 
the most significant genetic trait passed from parent to child,” is not the 
only consideration driving this practice.172 As author Amie Klempnauer 
Miller explains: 
I wanted to find a donor who could be a genetic proxy for 
Jane, because what we really wanted, truth be told, was to 
make a baby together. I wanted this anonymous man to be a 
silent partner, to transmit the qualities Jane would give if we 
could make a baby ourselves.173 
Small wonder that, for some couples, the “number one preferred” 
gamete donor or surrogate is a member of the non-genetic parent’s 
family, ideally a sibling.174 
Biogenetic investments also shape the conduct of gestational 
surrogacy arrangements. Many male couples who become parents this 
way opt for a “mixed transfer,” such that “eggs are fertilized with 
sperm from each man,” giving both of them a chance at being the 
biological father and introducing temporary ambiguity as to who had 
the lucky gamete.175 Some couples mitigate the potential 
competitiveness of this practice by pursuing “twins”—two children with 
different fathers, the same gestational mother, and the same genetic 
mother.176 This technique recalls the more common practice, employed 
by men and women alike, of “trading reproductive roles”—alternating 
over the course of years between one partner’s gametes or womb and 
the other’s.177 
 
 171. Pelka, supra note 164, at 83–84. The prevalence of this phenomenon is 
well-documented. See, e.g., Berkowitz, supra note 108, at 77; CAHN, supra note 18, at 
53–54; MAMO, supra note 102, at 190–91; Chabot & Ames, supra note 109, at 352; 
Dorothy A. Greenfeld & Emre Seli, Gay Men Choosing Parenthood Through Assisted 
Reproduction: Medical and Psychosocial Considerations, 95 FERTILITY & STERILITY 
225, 226–27 (2011); Hayden, supra note 24, at 53. 
 172. ROBERTS, supra note 39, at 267, 282.  
 173. AMIE K. MILLER, SHE LOOKS JUST LIKE YOU: A MEMOIR OF 
(NONBIOLOGICAL LESBIAN) MOTHERHOOD 14 (2010). 
 174. JOHNSON & O’CONNOR, supra note 139, at 99; see also Pelka, supra note 
164, at 84; Hayden, supra note 24, at 50. 
 175. CAHN, supra note 18, at 55. On gay men’s use of mixed transfers and the 
related pursuit of twins in the context of surrogacy arrangements, see Berkowitz, supra 
note 108, at 76; Pelka, supra note 164, at 84. 
 176. See, e.g., LIZA MUNDY, EVERYTHING CONCEIVABLE 141 (2007) 
(describing a couple that refused to hire any surrogate who was not “willing to bear 
twins”). 
 177. Annette R. Appell, The Endurance of Biological Connection: 
Heteronormativity, Same-Sex Parenting and the Lessons of Adoption, 22 BYU J. PUB. 
L. 289, 314 (2008). 
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Whether taking turns or not, same-sex couples who wish to have 
multiple children often prefer to use the same donor repeatedly, so as to 
create genetic bonds between siblings.178 These fraternal connections 
sometimes become important even to individuals raised in different 
households by different parents. Recent years have seen the advent of 
“family communities” centered around individuals conceived by the 
same donor.179 Anecdotal reports suggest that participation in these 
networks may be particularly popular among single women and queer 
couples.180 
Clearly, same-sex couples can be “just as hesitant to relinquish the 
notion of biological parenthood as heterosexuals.”181 As therapist 
Suzanne Pelka observes, some queer couples “will use every available 
avenue of reproductive technology” to approximate biological 
procreation as nearly as possible.182 This longing for jointly conceived 
children explains why the enthusiasm that once greeted the prospect of 
human cloning has been largely supplanted by hopes for technologies 
that would permit genetic mergers between two persons of the same 
sex: chimerization, whereby cells from two different embryos “mix 
together and communicate as if they had the same origin,” creating 
what will develop into a single fetus;183 haploidization, which makes 
clever use of the fact that a fertilized egg does not have a single nucleus 
but rather two haploid pronuclei, one from each gamete, in the first 
twenty or so hours after fertilization;184 and nuclear transfer, whereby 
an embryo is developed from a fertilized egg that possesses the nuclear 
DNA of one woman and the mitochondrial DNA of another.185 
A perceived drawback of the aforementioned techniques is that, 
unlike cloning, they cannot by themselves eliminate the need for third-
 
 178. CAHN, supra note 18, at 59. 
 179. Id. at 2, 61–87. These donor-sibling networks, some of which “have 
begun to organize into more or less durable clans,” Marvel, supra note 70, at 233, 
were largely enabled by the Donor Sibling Registry, an online enterprise that helps 
donor-conceived individuals “make mutually desired contact with others with whom 
they share genetic ties.” Our History And Mission, THE DONOR SIBLING REGISTRY, 
https://www.donorsiblingregistry.com/about-dsr/history-and-mission 
[https://perma.cc/6NC3-CVR6] (last visited Oct. 26, 2016). 
 180. Marvel, supra note 70, at 231–32, 248. 
 181. GOLDBERG, supra note 114, at 47–48. 
 182. Pelka, supra note 164, at 91. 
 183. Robertson, supra note 60, at 368. 
 184. “If one of the haploid pronuclei is removed before it combines with the 
other, it could be joined with the haploid pronuclei of the partner produced in another 
fertilization.” Robertson, supra note 60, at 370. 
 185. June Carbone, Negating the Genetic Tie: Does the Law Encourage 
Unnecessary Risks?, 79 UMKC L. REV. 333, 342 (2011). 
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party donors.186 Hence the special appeal of in vitro gameteogenesis 
(IVG), a process successfully tested in mice, whereby a sperm cell is 
created from an egg cell—or, alternatively, an egg cell is created from 
a sperm cell. IVG could allow same-sex couples to have offspring 
biologically related to both partners and, by eliminating the need for 
third-party gametes, enable them “to reproduce in a manner similar to 
fertile straight couples.”187 
If the speculative technologies just described were to become 
realities, and if society were to permit their use, many same-sex 
couples will jump at the opportunities they present. Already, biogenetic 
ideas about family and selfhood strongly influence why and how LGBT 
people use ARTs, and many queer couples are firmly wedded to a 
romantic ideal of procreation. These tendencies are nothing if not 
understandable. As we have seen, the norm of biogenetic parenthood, 
powerful throughout our society, can be all the more compelling to 
those whom that norm has historically rejected. 
Then again, exclusion from the biogenetic family paradigm can 
spur quite a different reaction: defiance. Indeed, defiance of 
biogeneticism has long been—and in many ways continues to be—a 
distinctive part of LGBT culture and politics. Part Three below surveys 
that tradition. 
III. AGAINST BIOGENETICISM: QUEER KINSHIP 
There is something like poetic justice in the fact that private 
practices of assisted procreation, so deeply touched by biogeneticism, 
themselves gave rise to the cases that most eloquently stated the LGBT 
movement’s own counter-ideology. The first subsection below 
describes those cases—namely, battles for parental rights involving 
children conceived through reproductive technologies. The second 
subsection charts the political, cultural, and intellectual currents that 
informed and continue to inform the movement’s stress on functional 
rather than biological conceptions of family. The third subsection 
discusses LGBT adults’ familial but nonbiological relationships with 
children. 
 
 186. This drawback theoretically could be overcome through an intricate 
combination of cloning and gene splicing. Aloni, supra note 64, at 21; see also 
Carbone, supra note 185, at 334 (“[A]s reproductive technology becomes more 
sophisticated, prospective parents are likely to choose, if they can, to have children 
who are closely related to them and not to others.”). 
 187. Sonia M. Suter, In Vitro Gametogenesis: Just Another Way to Have a 
Baby?, 3 J.L. & BIOSCIENCES 87, 103 (2016) (noting that, “until artificial wombs 
become available, gay [male] couples would still require a surrogate”). 
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A. Legal History: Custody and Visitation Cases 
In 1977, during her stint at the helm of an organization called 
“Save Our Children,” singer and erstwhile beauty queen Anita Bryant 
repeatedly proclaimed that, because “homosexuals cannot reproduce, 
they must recruit.”188 The slogan obliquely but pithily communicated 
Save Our Children’s foremost objection to a Miami ordinance 
prohibiting schools, among other employers, from discriminating on the 
basis of sexual orientation.189 The real problem with the measure was 
not, as Bryant’s pastor suggested, that placing a known homosexual at 
the head of a classroom was tantamount to “letting a fox in the chicken 
coop.”190 Rather, the bogeyman of the homosexual predator was 
conjured to dramatize the more plausible fear that openly gay teachers 
would send a blasé or even favorable message about homosexuality, 
thereby derailing students’ development into healthy heterosexuals.191 
Bryant’s “crusade,” as she called it, was an especially sensational 
articulation of the imperative to keep LGBT people away from 
children.192 This imperative has long been a motivator and rhetorical 
mainstay of opposition to LGBT rights, particularly in the domain of 
family law.193 Jurisdictions like Florida, which in 1977 responded to 
events in Miami by enacting a ban on adoption by “practicing 
homosexuals,”194 simply ratified the exclusionary policies that most 
adoption agencies then pursued voluntarily—and that many agencies, 
often religiously affiliated, still follow today.195 Meanwhile, for years 
before and after Bryant’s confident assertions that “homosexuals cannot 
 
 188. ANITA BRYANT, THE ANITA BRYANT STORY: THE SURVIVAL OF OUR 
NATION’S FAMILIES AND THE THREAT OF MILITANT HOMOSEXUALITY 146 (1977). 
 189. Bias Against Homosexuals Is Outlawed in Miami, N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 19, 
1977), http://www.nytimes.com/1977/01/19/archives/bias-against-homosexuals-is-
outlawed-in-miami.html [https://perma.cc/UR89-DW9Z]. 
 190. Theodore Stanger, Dade Approves Ordinance Banning Bias Against Gays, 
MIAMI HERALD, Jan. 19, 1977, at A1. 
 191. “[T]he major harm is when a person wants to flaunt homosexuality, wants 
to be able to come out of the closet . . . .” Tropic Interviews Anita Bryant, MIAMI 
HERALD TROPIC MAG., May 29, 1977, at 6 (quoting Bryant). 
 192. Dennis A. Williams, Anita Bryant’s Crusade, NEWSWEEK, Apr. 11, 1977, 
at 39 (quoting Bryant’s promise to “lead such a crusade to stop [homosexuality] as this 
country has not seen before”). 
 193. See generally Clifford J. Rosky, Fear of the Queer Child, 61 BUFF. L. 
REV. 607 (2013). 
 194. Lofton v. Sec’y of the Dep’t of Children & Family Servs., 358 F.3d 806, 
806 (11th Cir. 2011); see also 1977 Fla. Laws 466; FLA. STAT. § 63.042(3) (2002). 
 195. See Adam Pertman & Jeanne Howard, Emerging Diversity in Family Life: 
Adoption by Gay and Lesbian Parents, in ADOPTION BY LESBIANS AND GAY MEN 20, 26–
27 (David M. Brodzinsky & Adam Pertman eds., 2012). Several states have statutes 
explicitly permitting agencies to discriminate on “religious or moral” grounds. See, 
e.g., N.D. CENT. CODE § 50-12-07.1 (2013); VA. CODE. ANN. § 63.2-1709.3 (2012). 
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reproduce,” scores of gay men and lesbians who had done just that 
were alleged and often adjudged to be incapable of “promoting and 
protecting their children’s well-being.”196 
In custody and visitation suits involving individuals who became 
parents before emerging from the closet, LGBT advocates forcefully 
invoked the constitutional and statutory rights of biological mothers and 
fathers.197 Yet by the mid-1980s, in cases occasioned by the spread of 
“lesbian insemination” and the resultant “gayby boom,”198 it became 
clear that litigators’ appeals to biology were more strategically than 
ideologically motivated. The new cases appearing on their dockets 
typically arose in two scenarios: either a nonbiological mother would 
seek to preserve a relationship with the child of her former partner; or a 
biological father, most often a semen donor and sometimes a gay man, 
would assert paternal rights vis-à-vis a child raised by two women.199 
Although the major LGBT litigation firms had never before represented 
an openly queer person against another, they quickly resolved that in 
neither kind of case could they allow genetic affinity to undermine 
practical, if not genetic, parent-child bonds.200 
LGBT advocates’ functionalist stances in disputes involving 
children created through assisted procreation—their claims that legal 
recognition as family should follow conduct and attachment rather than 
biology—contrasted only superficially with their ongoing representation 
of clients with offspring from prior heterosexual relationships. As 
movement scholar Carlos Ball explains, much more than biogenetic ties 
was at stake in the first-generation custody and visitation cases. The 
LGBT parents who fought those battles, no less than the lesbian co-
mothers who came later, were seeking to preserve established 
relationships of physical care, financial support, and bilateral affection. 
Biology was but one basis—”neither necessary nor sufficient”—for 
retention of parental rights.201 
Today, in confronting relatively new questions like whether and 
how to apply the presumption of paternity to married same-sex couples, 
 
 196. CARLOS A. BALL, THE RIGHT TO BE PARENTS: LGBT FAMILIES AND THE 
TRANSFORMATION OF PARENTHOOD 9 (2012). 
 197. See, e.g., In re J.S. & C., 324 A.2d 90, 94 (N.J. Super. Ct. 1974); In re 
Jane B., 380 N.Y.S.2d 848, 856–59 (Sup. Ct. 1976). 
 198. See supra notes 54–55 and accompanying text. 
 199. Nancy D. Polikoff, Raising Children: Lesbian and Gay Parents Face the 
Public and the Courts, in CREATING CHANGE: SEXUALITY, PUBLIC POLICY, AND CIVIL 
RIGHTS 305, 323 (John D’Emilio et al. eds., 2000). 
 200. Id. at 323–24. Lambda Legal had never before sued an openly LGBT 
individual, BALL, supra note 196, at 89, and the National Center for Lesbian Rights 
chose to abandon its explicit rule against “representing one lesbian against another.” 
Polikoff, supra note 199, at 323. 
 201. BALL, supra note 196, at 139. 
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LGBT advocates maintain their principled opposition to “[p]referring 
biological parent-child relationships over other legal parent-child 
relationships, and preferring traditional family structures over non-
traditional family structures.”202 As movement lawyers told the Iowa 
Supreme Court in 2013, such preferences “‘stigmatiz[e] adoption as 
second-best,’ . . . [and they] stigmatiz[e] other children who are not 
genetically related to their parents, whether because they were 
conceived through reproductive technology or [through] intercourse 
with a non-marital partner.”203 
B. Political, Social, and Intellectual History 
The principle that biogenetic affinity is “neither necessary nor 
sufficient” to establish familial relationships boasts an extensive 
genealogy in LGBT politics and culture. At least since Stonewall,204 
LGBT people’s “exclusion from family” as conventionally defined has 
informed the construction of competing ideals and practices of intimacy 
and kinship.205 As writer and activist John Preston observed in the early 
1980s, “alienation . . . from our genetic families” is a common LGBT 
experience.206 To this day, coming out to relatives as gay, lesbian, 
bisexual, or transgender “put[s] to the test the unconditional love and 
enduring solidarity commonly understood . . . to characterize blood 
ties.”207 At the same time—and contributing mightily to individuals’ 
estrangement from families of origin—LGBT people historically have 
been excluded from “the patterns of . . . love, marriage, children, etc., 
 
 202. See Brief for Petitioner at 71–72, Gartner v. Iowa Dep’t of Pub. Health, 
830 N.W.2d 335 (Iowa 2013) (No. 12-0243).  
 203. Id. (quoting Susan Frelich Appleton, Presuming Women: Revisiting the 
Presumption of Legitimacy in the Same-Sex Couples Era, 86 B.U. L. REV. 227, 229 
n.11 (2006)). 
 204. See PETER M. NARDI, GAY MEN'S FRIENDSHIPS 52–53, 196 (1999) 
(citations omitted) (identifying antecedents of more contemporary queer kinship patterns 
in scholarship about lesbian and gay subcultures in the United States from the 1920s to 
the 1960s). See also Matt Cook, Families of Choice? George Ives, Queer Lives and the 
Family in Early Twentieth-Century Britain, 22 GENDER & HIST. 1, 10, 13 (2010) 
(describing George Ives’ queer, class-mixed household as an “adopted family” 
“connected by co-residence rather than by ‘blood’ ties”). 
 205. LEHR, supra note 1, at 41 (arguing that this exclusion led to “the 
development of an alternative understanding of family”); see also Didi Herman, Are 
We Family? Lesbian Rights and Women’s Liberation, 28 OSGOODE HALL L.J. 789, 801 
(1990) (same). 
 206. John Preston, Brothers and Fathers and Sons, in THE CHRISTOPHER 
STREET READER 191, 195 (Michael Denneny et al. eds., 1983).  
 207. WESTON, supra note 118, at 43–44; see also infra notes 289–290 and 
accompanying text (discussing LGBT youth’s overrepresentation in foster care and 
among the homeless). 
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upon which the dominant culture rests:”208 entry into heterosexual 
marriage; maturation into procreative sexuality; and conformity to a 
gender system that “equates male, masculine, man ONLY with husband 
and Father . . . [and] female, feminine, woman ONLY with wife and 
Mother.”209 
It was thus from a perspective of personal and symbolic 
dissociation from the traditional family that, in the early 1970s, gay 
liberationists articulated a stinging and multifarious critique of that 
institution. Many of the flaws they identified were (or at the time 
seemed) inextricably bound up with the family’s procreative function: 
its instrumentalist view of sex and its “negative attitude toward all 
sexual urges other than those that are genital and heterosexual;”210 its 
insistence on monogamy;211 its “bondage” of wife to husband and of 
mother to child;212 its inculcation of the “artificial” categories of gender 
and sexual orientation;213 and its satisfaction of “capital’s need for a 
labour supply.”214 In feisty manifestos imagining the demise or even the 
“abolition of . . . the bourgeois nuclear family,”215 liberationists 
endorsed gay communes as “a new form of extended family,”216 and 
they championed homosexuality as an “expression of hedonism and 
love free of any utilitarian social ends,”217 an antidote to “biological 
functionalism.”218 They called for “radical changes in [society’s] 
attitude towards bearing and raising children,” beginning with relief 
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 210. Jill Johnson, Selections from Lesbian Nation, in RADICAL FEMINISM 351 
(Barbara A. Crow ed., 2000).  
 211. The Red Butterfly, The Anthropological Perspective (1970), reprinted in 
OUT OF THE CLOSETS: VOICES OF GAY LIBERATION 157, 164–65 (Karla Jay & Allen 
Young eds., 1972); Carl Wittman, A Gay Manifesto, S.F. FREE PRESS, Dec. 22, 1969, 
reprinted in OUT OF THE CLOSETS: VOICES OF GAY LIBERATION 330, 333 (Karla Jay & 
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 215. THIRD WORLD GAY REVOLUTION, supra note 213, at 363, 365.  
 216. DENNIS ALTMAN, HOMOSEXUAL: OPPRESSION AND LIBERATION 124 (1971). 
 217. Id. at 89. See also GUY HOCQUENGHEM, THE SCREWBALL ASSES 39 
(Noura Wedell trans., Semiotext(e) 2010) (1973) (“We do not have children. We do not 
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 218. SIDNEY ABBOTT & BARBARA LOVE, SAPPHO WAS A RIGHT-ON WOMAN 145 
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from “social pressures to[] procreat[e].”219 Echoing the childfree 
movement that emerged at roughly the same time, some liberationists 
proposed “voluntary childlessness” not only as “a legitimate alternative 
to parenthood, but a better lifestyle—better for individuals, better for 
couples, better for the planet.”220 They touted homosexuality as “the 
strongest remedy” to the global “pollution” wrought by humanity’s 
unprecedented proliferation.221 Placards at early gay pride events 
proclaimed, “More deviation, less population[!]”222 
Liberationist critiques of the reproductive family would 
reverberate decades later in some of the most influential works of queer 
theory. The parallels are striking. Where Guy Hocquenghem suggested 
in 1972 that “[t]he great fear of homosexuality” is in essence “a fear 
that the succession of generations, on which civilization is based, may 
stop,”223 Lee Edelman argued more than thirty years later that 
“queerness names the side of those” who contest “reproductive 
futurism,” society’s commitment to literally and figuratively 
reproducing itself.224 Where Dennis Altman in 1971 espoused the 
Nietzschean idea that “the desire for children is often a product of 
suffering, of a need to reject oneself,”225 Michael Warner coined the 
term “reprosexuality” in 1993 to describe a subjectivity that, among 
other things, must “find[] its . . . fulfillment in generational 
transmission.”226 Where the Seattle Gay Liberation Front railed two 
years after Stonewall against the “myth” that happiness lies only in 
“raising children in a nuclear family” with one’s “one-and only-true-
love-forever,”227 Jack (then Judith) Halberstam wrote in 2005 that 
queerness is out of step with the regular march of “reproductive time” 
from love to marriage to baby carriage.228 Finally, in their distinctive 
voices, three of queer theory’s most prominent thinkers—Judith Butler, 
David Halperin, and Eve Kosofsky Sedgwick—have shared gay 
liberation’s dream of structures beyond the procreative nuclear family 
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that “better serve [people’s] needs for companionship, love, sex, [and] 
all that is humanizing.”229 
In the decades separating Stonewall-era discourses on family and 
reproduction from their queer-theory descendants, the anti-biogenticism 
of LGBT subcultures grew more perspicuous. In Families We Choose 
(1991), a now-classic study of gay and lesbian life in and around San 
Francisco, anthropologist Kath Weston wrote that, “at a certain point in 
history”—certainly by the late 1970s—there arose in queer communities 
an explicit distinction between “chosen” family, identified as gay, and 
“blood” family, identified as straight.230 “[C]onceived in opposition to 
biogenetic givens,” gay and lesbian families of choice were more than 
voluntary social “networks.”231 These queer kinship arrangements 
“quite consciously incorporated symbolic demonstrations of love, 
shared history, material or emotional assistance, and other signs of 
enduring solidarity.”232 Chosen families could “incorporate friends, 
lovers, or children, in any combination,” and very often they included 
ex-lovers who had become friends.233 Because one’s identification of 
kin within this framework “pictured . . . a cluster [of persons] 
surrounding a single individual,” rather than flanking a married pair 
with children, “even the most nuclear of couples would construct 
theoretically distinguishable families . . . .”234 
Some participants in the Families We Choose study “had chosen to 
create families and some had not, some had become parents and some 
had not . . . .”235 But on one point Weston found virtual unanimity: 
“almost all [subjects] associated their sexual identities with a release 
 
 229. DIAMAN, supra note 213, at 2; Judith Butler, Is Kinship Always Already 
Heterosexual?, 13 DIFFERENCES 14, 34 (2002) (endorsing anthropologist “David 
Schneider’s suggestion that kinship . . . does not reflect a prior structure but . . . can 
only be understood as an enacted practice”); DAVID M. HALPERIN, HOW TO BE GAY 450 
(2012) (critiquing a “style of social existence [in which] . . . love, . . . solidarity, sex, 
reproduction, child-raising, generational succession, caretaking, mutual support, shared 
living space, shared finances, property ownership, and private life [all] go together”); 
EVE KOSOFSKY SEDGWICK, Queer and Now, in TENDENCIES 1, 5 (1993) (proposing to 
disaggregate the many properties—“a surname[,] a sexual dyad[,] a legal unit based on 
. . . marriage[,] a circuit of blood relationships[,] a system of companionship and 
succor[,] . . . a . . . site of economic . . . [and] cultural consumption[,] a mechanism to 
produce, care for, and acculturate children[,]” etc.—currently “impacted” in the ideal 
of “the family”). 
 230. WESTON, supra note 118, at 29, 35, 74. For an early use of the expression 
“chosen family,” see O’Donnell, supra note 60, at 8 (“Hospital Guidelines and health-
insurance plans do not recognize a lesbian’s lover and friends as her chosen family.”). 
 231. WESTON, supra note 118, at 109–10. 
 232. Id. (using terminology—“enduring solidarity”—borrowed from 
SCHNEIDER, supra note 17, at 61). 
 233. Id. at 27, 111–12, 196. 
 234. Id. at 109–10. 
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1100 WISCONSIN LAW REVIEW 
from any sort of procreative imperative.”236 This was a politically 
potent dispensation. When “people who claim nonprocreative sexual 
identities and pursue nonprocreative relationships . . . lay claim to 
family ties,” wrote Weston, they mount an “attack on the privilege 
accorded to a biogenetically grounded mode of determining what 
relationships will count as kinship.”237 
Statistics will never tell just how many LGBT people have 
understood themselves to have “chosen” their “families.” Some, no 
doubt, have felt more constraint than volition in this aspect of their 
lives,238 while others have worried that the whole notion of “family” is 
itself irredeemable.239 But Weston’s central thesis—that “lesbians and 
gay men . . . have formulated a critique of kinship that contests 
assumptions about the bearing of biology, genetics, and heterosexual 
intercourse on the meaning of family”240—is corroborated by sources 
spanning more than half a century and representing a wide range of 
LGBT cultures and experiences.241 Auto-biographical accounts,242 
literary works,243 and documentary films like Paris Is Burning (1990), 
 
 236. Id.  
 237. Id. at 35 (emphasis omitted).  
 238. Elizabeth Freeman, Queer Belongings: Kinship Theory and Queer Theory, 
in A COMPANION TO LESBIAN, GAY, BISEXUAL, TRANSGENDER, AND QUEER STUDIES 
295, 304 (George E. Haggerty & Molly McGarry eds., 2007) (arguing that the term 
“‘chosen family’ . . . presumes a range of economic, racial, gender, and national 
privileges to which many sexual dissidents do not have access . . . .”). 
 239. .See, e.g., Ruthann Robson, Resisting the Family: Repositioning Lesbians 
in Legal Theory, 19 SIGNS 975 (1994); Eve Kosofsky Sedgwick, Tales of the 
Avunculate, in TENDENCIES 52, 71–72 (1993). 
 240. WESTON, supra note 118, at 34. 
 241. While it is important to acknowledge that some LGBT individuals and 
communities maintain a biogenetic conception of family alongside or even in lieu of a 
social one, it is equally important to distinguish between prioritizing biogenetic ties per 
se and prioritizing relationships with people to whom one is biologically related. Thus, 
for example, it would be premature to conclude that the lesbian couples studied by 
Mignon Moore are simply deferring to the primacy of genes when one or both partners 
considers the biological mother the primary parent. In over two-thirds of the families 
Moore studied, “the biological mother’s partner moved into an existing single-parent 
household that the biological mother had established.” Mignon R. Moore, Gendered 
Power Relations Among Women: A Study of Household Decision Making in Black, 
Lesbian Stepfamilies, 73 AM. SOC. REV. 335, 348 (2008). 
 242. See, e.g., MILLER, supra note 173, at 69–70 (recounting the author’s own 
experience of “family” in friendship); JAY QUINN, THE MENTOR: A MEMOIR OF 
FRIENDSHIP AND GAY IDENTITY 3 (2000) (recounting the evolution of one particularly 
important friendship in the course of a broader “discussion of mentoring and gay 
identity”); LARRY KRAMER, REPORTS FROM THE HOLOCAUST: THE STORY OF AN AIDS 
ACTIVIST 271 (1989) (describing how gay people “have turned to our friends to take the 
place of families”); ETHAN MORDDEN, BUDDIES 48 (1987) (explaining that “my family 
is my buddies”). 
 243. See, e.g., HANYA YANAGIHARA, A LITTLE LIFE (2015); ALISON BECHDEL, 
THE ESSENTIAL: DYKES TO WATCH OUT FOR (2008) (collecting selections from a comic 
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with its riveting depiction of the “house” culture of black and Latino 
drag queens in New York City,244 attest to the ongoing centrality of 
friendships and other “bonds that tie” in LGBT lives.245 So do 
numerous academic studies.246 Throughout these literatures, terms like 
“family,” “brother,” “sister,” “mother,” and “father” are regularly 
applied to persons related by neither law nor genes, but rather through 
bonds of care and affection247—or even through bonds of political and 
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Selfhood: The Bond That Ties, VILLAGE VOICE, July 1, 1986, at 19. 
 246. See, e.g., David M. Frost et al., Social Support Networks Among Diverse 
Sexual Minority Populations, 86 AM. J. ORTHOPSYCHIATRY 91, 95–96 (2016) (finding 
that gay and bisexual men of all races—but not, interestingly, lesbian and bisexual 
women—received most of their “major support, such as . . . a large sum of money in 
an emergency,” not from kin but “from other individuals, who were mostly . . . LGB . 
. .”); Jacqueline S. Weinstock, Lesbian Ex-Lover Relationships, 8 J. LESBIAN STUD. 1 
(2004) (describing “a commitment to ex-lovers” and “a sense of uniqueness about the 
prevalence and closeness” of those relationships as hallmarks of lesbian communities); 
JEFFREY WEEKS ET AL., SAME SEX INTIMACIES 76 (2001) (calling “a friendship ethic . . 
. the key feature of the contemporary non-heterosexual world”); NARDI, supra note 
204, at 13, 164 (positing that “[f]riendship may be the central organizing element of 
gay men’s lives,” and finding, in a study of 543 gay men with AIDS, that “41 percent 
[were being cared for] by friends . . . [and l]ess than a fifth were being cared for by 
either legal or blood relatives”); MARTIN P. LEVINE, GAY MACHO 43–44, 46 (1998) 
(demonstrating that members of a 1970s subculture remembered for little more than 
sex, drugs, and disco depended on “cliques . . . that proved remarkably stable over 
time” and “served all the functions of the family, except, of course, that of biological 
reproduction”); KENNETH PLUMMER, TELLING SEXUAL STORIES 154 (1995) (discussing 
“networks of support, care and friendship that are as strong as any family, and maybe 
stronger because they are chosen rather than simply given”). 
 247. See, e.g., Katherine Arnup, Family, in LESBIAN HISTORIES AND 
CULTURES: AN ENCYCLOPEDIA 288, 290 (Bonnie Zimmerman ed., 2000) (describing 
lesbians who “have adopted the term ‘family’ to apply to the communities of support, 
solidarity, and love in which they live and work[,]” rather than or in addition to “their 
families of origin or their coupled relationships”); NARDI, supra note 204, at 48–49 
(quoting a study participant who said, flatly, “‘[m]y gay friends are like family’” and 
another who reflected on “‘the importance and meaning of having my gay brothers and 
sisters act as surrogate family members’”); LEVINE, supra note 246, at 46–47 (noting 
that members of urban “cliques” in the late 1970s assumed roles like “mother,” “big 
brother,” “kid brother,” “brother,” “sister,” and “cousin”); WILLIAM HAWKESWOOD, 
ONE OF THE CHILDREN: GAY BLACK MEN IN HARLEM 64 (1997) (reporting informants’ 
regular use of “brother” and “sister” to refer to friends); Preston, supra note 206, at 
192–94 (conceptualizing the author’s closest relationships in terms of “brotherhood”); 
BRUCE RODGERS, THE QUEENS’ VERNACULAR 25, 37, 60, 138, 181–82 (1972) 
(including entries for familial terms (used by gay men, lesbians, or both) like “sister,” 
“auntie,” “brother,” “mother,” and “daughter”); Jean Weber, Lesbian Networks, 
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quasi-ethnic solidarity.248 Time and again, such usages are accompanied 
by explicit affirmations that love is yet thicker than blood.249 
C. Nonbiological Bonds with Children 
Intergenerational kinship has long been a feature of LGBT families 
of choice. Often, such relationships have been experienced and 
theorized through metaphors of adoption and avuncularity (literally, 
“the state of being an uncle”).250 While adoption (again, as a metaphor) 
 
CHRISTOPHER STREET, Apr. 1979, at 51, 51 (referring to “[c]ountless gay women” who 
belong to “insular circles of friends . . . that often resemble extended families”). 
 248. The idea that, in Weston’s words, “community would replace alienated 
biological ties” has persisted since the early 1970s, when liberationists wrote 
idealistically of gay living collectives. WESTON, supra note 118, at 127. See, e.g., 
Lyndsey D’Arcangelo, A Different Kind of Family, BUFFALO LOOP, April 2015, at 7 
(reflecting on the continued invocation of the word “family” to describe other gay 
people); NARDI, supra note 204, at 52 (“[I]t is not uncommon today nor has it been 
uncommon historically for people to signal that others . . . are also gay or lesbian by 
suggesting that they are ‘a member of the family’ [or by using] more explicit kinship 
terminology.”); Susan Harben, We Are Family, in BEYOND BLOOD: WRITINGS ON THE 
LESBIAN AND GAY FAMILY 5, 6 (Louise Wakeling & Margaret Bradstock eds., 1995) 
(“[T]he gay and lesbian family at the macro level[,] . . . [is] a social and cultural 
construct . . . [whose] members are bound by common interest and relationships of 
care.”); NANCY ANDREWS, FAMILY: A PORTRAIT OF GAY AND LESBIAN AMERICA (1994) 
(noting in the author’s foreword that “[t]he word family is slang for ‘gay’ in many parts 
of the country”); Preston, supra note 206, at 129 (assigning significance to the fact that 
the hit song, “‘We Are Family[,]’ swept gay discos with . . . a powerful impact” when 
it appeared in 1979); ALTMAN, supra note 216, at 124 (advocating gay communes as “a 
new form of . . . family”). 
 249. See, e.g., MILLER, supra note 173, at 70 (comparing the special status of 
“ties of blood and marriage” in “the broader world” to the “blurred” lines between 
family and friend in the gay world); YVETTE TAYLOR, LESBIAN AND GAY PARENTING 60 
(2002) (describing study participants who “articulated notions of an extended family, . . 
. refusing the connections of blood alone”); Terry Boggis, Affording Our Families: 
Class Issues in Family Formation, in QUEER FAMILIES, QUEER POLITICS 175, 180 (Mary 
Bernstein & Renate Reimann eds., 2001) (“Many of us have . . . created families for 
ourselves, based not so much on blood connections but on intimate friendship [and] 
shared struggle . . . .”); LEVINE, supra note 246, at 43 (“[I]solated from their 
biological families . . . , the clique was [a] surrogate for the nuclear family.”); Clare 
Riley, American Kinship: A Lesbian Account, 8 FEMINIST ISSUES 75, 90–91 (1998) 
(finding that, for lesbian study participants, a “traditional model . . . [of kinship] based 
on blood and marriage” had “little significance in their [daily] lives”); Robert E. Goss, 
Queering Procreative Privilege: Coming Out as Families, in OUR FAMILIES, OUR 
VALUES 3, 8, 11 (Robert E. Goss & Amy A.S. Strongheart eds., 1997) (“Queer folks 
undermine the idea of family as a biological kinship unit” and “Queer sexuality 
proclaims an independence from the procreative model”); PLUMMER, supra note 246, at 
154 (contrasting “families we choose or create” with “biological/blood families”). 
 250. Avuncular, OXFORD ENGLISH DICTIONARY, 
http://www.oed.com/view/Entry/13848?redirectedFrom=avuncularity#eid31668239 
[https://perma.cc/36GZ-28PG] (last visited Oct. 26, 2016). For an influential 
meditation on queerness and avuncularity, see Sedgwick, supra note 239. 
2016:1065       Is Assisted Procreation an LGBT Right? 1103 
has tended to describe relationships between adults—like the 
“fascinating tendency on the part of more experienced gay men to 
‘adopt’ young, less knowledgeable gay men”251—avuncularity has more 
often described adult relationships with children. These latter 
relationships have sometimes had a biological component,252 but they 
have also arisen in the absence of any tie through blood or marriage.253 
Author Stefan Lynch recalls that, after his parents were “essentially . . 
. disowned” by their relatives when they both came out of the closet, 
“my family were these mostly gay guys, whom I called my aunties.”254 
What is avuncular is not—or not quite—parental, a distinction that 
may be particularly poignant to LGBT parents themselves, who are 
often the first to observe that having and raising a child, even in an 
alternative family, can cut short a hitherto alternative lifestyle.255 But if 
parenthood is sometimes said to wrench individuals “out of their 
location in gay life,”256 non-parental relationships with young people 
 
 251. Preston, supra note 206, at 193. See also GERRE GOODMAN ET AL., NO 
TURNING BACK: LESBIAN AND GAY LIBERATION FOR THE '80S, at 97 (1983) (“[I]n the 
gay world, . . . there are many men who assume they should be ‘big brothers’ and 
show newcomers the ropes.”); LEVINE, supra note 246, at 47 (discussing men who took 
up the role of “mother” or “big brother” to relative newcomers to the gay subculture); 
NARDI, supra note 204, at 54 (describing a respondent who “spoke about his much 
older close friends as a ‘role model, a mentor’”). Such “parenting” or “mentoring” 
relationships would remain a feature of many gay lives. See QUINN, supra note 242, 
passim. 
 252. Jack Drescher, The Circle of Liberation, in GAY AND LESBIAN PARENTING 
119, 124 (Deborah Glazer & Jack Drescher eds., 2001) (noting that, “at the start of the 
modern gay liberation movement, being an uncle or an aunt was [sometimes] the only 
significant child-rearing role envisioned for gay men and lesbians”). 
 253. See Gary Dunne, Happy Little Vegemites, in BEYOND BLOOD: WRITINGS 
ON THE LESBIAN AND GAY FAMILY 5, 93 (Louise Wakeling & Margaret Bradstock eds., 
1995) (avowing that the author would not be “any more protective or loving towards a 
child I’m related to than I’ve been with my nieces and nephews”) (emphasis added). 
 254. Stefan Lynch, Stefan Lynch, 40, Remembers His Family to His Friend 
Beth Teper, 43, in TIES THAT BIND 69 (Dave Isay & Lizzie Jacobs eds., 2013). It would 
be interesting to know whether any of these aunties left or intend to leave Lynch an 
inheritance. Law professor Daniel Monk’s study of will-writing practices found that 
gay men and lesbians are far more likely than heterosexuals to make some provision for 
“godchildren” and “children of friends.” Daniel Monk, Sexuality and Children Post-
Equality, in AFTER LEGAL EQUALITY: FAMILY, SEX, KINSHIP 200, 209–11 (Robert 
Leckey ed., 2015). 
 255. See GOLDBERG, supra note 114, at 2 (describing a same-sex couple that, 
after having children, “noted shifts in their support networks in that they spent less time 
with their nonparent friends (who were mostly gay), and more time with their friends 
who were parents (and who were often heterosexual)”); SAVAGE, supra note 146, at 26 
(noting that, with parenthood, Savage and his partner had to “give[] up certain things 
that . . . [for them] define what it means to be gay”); Jetter, supra note 122, at 66 
(observing that motherhood has shifted “[t]he lesbian paradigm . . . from playing 
softball in the park to pushing strollers down the avenue”). 
 256. LEWIN, GAY FATHERHOOD, supra note 106, at 184; see also AMIN 
GHAZIANI, THERE GOES THE GAYBORHOOD? 122 (2014) (observing in a number of his 
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largely have been construed as markers of LGBT distinction, 
broadening the range of possible answers to the question, “how am I to 
be involved with children?”257 The erstwhile gay commune consisted 
primarily of members “from the same generation,” but it also offered a 
“solution for lesbian mothers and homosexuals [both male and female] 
who wish[ed] to participate in child care.”258 In later years, becoming 
“honorary aunts and uncles, godparents, role models, and mentors to . 
. . friends’ children,” are some of the means by which LGBT people 
have forged intergenerational attachments without undertaking all the 
responsibilities associated with parenting.259 
Of course, huge numbers of LGBT people have fully undertaken 
parental responsibilities—some in the context of heterosexual 
relationships, others via reproductive technologies, and still others by 
adoption and fostering. These last two methods have been easily 
“conceptualized . . . in terms of the values of the [LGBT] 
community,”260 which stress the affective and practical, rather than 
formal and biological, markers of kinship.261 Open adoption, also 
known as adoption-with-contact, has held particular appeal for LGBT 
parents. A reaction against the secrecy that characterized an age when 
adoptive families frequently sought to imitate the biogenetic model in 
all respects—”the child is as-if-begotten, the parent as-if-
genealogical”262—adoption-with-contact comports well with the 
“openness and honesty” associated with queer life since Stonewall.263 
 
LGBT-parent subjects the “ascendance of a parent identity while sexual identity recedes 
in comparison”); ARLENE STEIN, SEX AND SENSIBILITY 137 (1997) (finding, in a study 
of lesbian mothers, that “the locus of lesbian life was shifting away from communal 
attachments”); Jack Drescher, Are the Kids Alright? Avuncular Reflections on the 
Gayby Boom, 18 J. GAY & LESBIAN MENTAL HEALTH 222, 228 (2014) (recounting how, 
in the early 1990s, after two decades of seeing “heterosexual friends disappear into 
their child-rearing caves,” the author “suddenly . . . was seeing a similar thing happen 
to . . . gay and lesbian friends . . .”). 
 257. I borrow this phrasing from PLUMMER, supra note 246, at 154.  
 258. ALTMAN, supra note 216, at 147–48. 
 259. APRIL MARTIN, THE LESBIAN AND GAY PARENTING HANDBOOK 43 (1993).  
 260. Abbie E. Goldberg et al., The Transition from Infertility to Adoption: 
Perceptions of Lesbian and Heterosexual Couples, 26 J. SOC. & PERS. RELATIONSHIPS 
938, 955 (2009). See also Tyzoon Tyebjee, Attitude, Interest, and Motivation for 
Adoption and Foster Care, 82 CHILD WELFARE 685, 703–04 (2003) (counting LGBT 
identity as a strong “ideological” influence on willingness to adopt). 
 261. These values recall beliefs and practices associated with African-American 
cultures, whose “ethic” for “dealing with infertility”—grounded in “skeptic[ism] about 
any obsession with genes” and a relaxed boundary between kin and non-kin—has often 
meant “reach[ing] out to the thousands of Black children in need of a home.” ROBERTS, 
supra note 39, at 260–61. 
 262. JUDITH S. MODELL, KINSHIP WITH STRANGERS: ADOPTION AND 
INTERPRETATIONS OF KINSHIP IN AMERICAN CULTURE 2 (1994). 
 263. GOLDBERG, supra note 114, at 51. The open adoption movement is 
sometimes said to “owe[] a debt to the lesbian and gay Pride movement—the idea of 
2016:1065       Is Assisted Procreation an LGBT Right? 1105 
No later than the mid-1970s, and amid considerable controversy, 
social service agencies began placing sexually active, gay-identified 
adolescents in households headed by gay men and lesbians.264 By the 
late 1980s, and despite the insulting truth that their homes usually were 
considered a “last resort,” gay and lesbian people had demonstrated an 
unusual willingness to adopt or foster other “hard-to-place children—
older children[,]. . . those with developmental delays, psychological 
issues, [and] physical disabilities,” especially AIDS.265 To this day, gay 
and lesbian adopters remain more amenable than heterosexuals to 
accept children who are “the most difficult to place,” and same-sex 
couples are more likely than different-sex couples to adopt “across 
racial lines.”266 
Lesbians, gay men, and bisexuals are also more likely than non-
LGB people to adopt,267 more likely to contemplate adopting,268 and 
 
being out of the closet and dispelling shame . . .” Rachel Epstein, Extra Love: An Open 
Adoption Story, in WHO’S YOUR DADDY?: AND OTHER WRITINGS ON QUEER PARENTING 
93, 94–95 (Rachel Epstein ed., 2009). See also Abbie E. Goldberg et al., Choices, 
Challenges, and Tensions: Perspectives of Lesbian Prospective Adoptive Parents, 10 
ADOPTION Q. 33, 46 (2007) (noting that ten of thirty-two lesbian women “explicitly 
noted that they were pursuing domestic open adoption because of their belief that 
adoption should not start with secrecy and deception, about sexual orientation or 
anything else”).  
 264. See Families by Adoption: A Gay Reality, ADVOCATE, Aug. 28, 1974, at 
1; Marie-Amélie George, Agency Nullification: Defying Bans on Gay and Lesbian 
Foster and Adoptive Parenting, 51 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 363, 375–78 (2016). 
 265. George, supra note 264, at 17; see also David Perry, Homes of Last 
Resort: Is America Dumping Its Unwanted Children on Gays Hoping to Adopt?, 
ADVOCATE, Dec. 5, 1989, at 45. 
 266. MOVEMENT ADVANCEMENT PROJECT ET AL., LGBT FOSTER AND ADOPTIVE 
FAMILIES: FINDING CHILDREN FOREVER HOMES 3 (2002) (citing Gary Mallon, Assessing 
Lesbian and Gay Prospective Foster and Adoptive Families, 86 CHILD WELFARE 67 
(2007)); Rachel H. Farr & Charlotte J. Patterson, Transracial Adoption by Lesbian, 
Gay, and Heterosexual Couples, 12 ADOPTION Q. 187, 200 (2009); Abbie E. Goldberg 
& Mark Gianino, Lesbian and Gay Adoptive Parent Families, in ADOPTION BY LESBIANS 
AND GAY MEN 204, 211 (David M. Brodzinsky & Adam Pertman eds., 2012) (citing 
“evidence that white same-sex couples are more likely to be open to, and to adopt, 
transracially compared to white heterosexual couples”). 
 267. See GARY J. GATES, WILLIAMS INST., DEMOGRAPHICS OF MARRIED AND 
UNMARRIED SAME-SEX COUPLES: ANALYSES OF THE 2013 AMERICAN COMMUNITY 
SURVEY 1 (2015) (“Same-sex couples are nearly three times as likely as their different-
sex counterparts to be raising an adopted or foster child.”).  
 268. The 2002 National Survey of Family Growth (NSFG) found that nearly 
half of lesbian and bisexual women, compared to one-third of heterosexual women, had 
considered adoption, and that lesbian and bisexual women were more likely than 
heterosexual women to have “taken concrete steps toward adopting” (5.7 percent versus 
3.3 percent). GARY J. GATES ET AL., ADOPTION AND FOSTER CARE BY GAY AND LESBIAN 
PARENTS IN THE UNITED STATES 6 (2007). The NSFG did not ask men the same 
questions about adoption but, since “gay and bisexual men are even more likely than 
lesbian and bisexual women to express an interest in having children,” and since neither 
partner in gay male couple can carry and deliver a child, gay men are probably more 
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more likely to identify adoption as “their preference from the start.”269 
Research comparing LGBT and non-LGBT adopters reveals significant 
differences in attitudes toward biogenetic parenthood. A 2009 study 
found that, despite the relative ease of assisted insemination, female 
same-sex couples who adopted were markedly less likely than their 
different-sex counterparts to have pursued fertility treatments.270 Even 
more tellingly, same-sex couples were far less likely than different-sex 
couples to feel “a strong desire for biological children”—40% of 
lesbians and 34% of gay men, versus 90% of straights.271 
Complementary results were obtained in a 2011 study finding that 
same-sex adoptive couples were considerably less prone than different-
sex couples to “internalize adoption stigma,”272 defined as the “feeling 
that being an adoptive parent is inferior to being a biological parent.”273 
LGBT people’s uncommonly warm embrace of adoption 
demonstrates the persistence, even in this age of assisted procreation, of 
the belief that love does not need blood to make a family. This belief is 
no mere acquiescence to circumstance—a defense against mourning 
what one cannot easily have. To the contrary, as this Part has shown, 
the particular ethic on which LGBT adoptive parents build their 
“families of choice” partakes of a rich history of queer resistance, both 
personal and political, to the ideology of biogenetic kinship. 
 
likely than lesbians to be interested in this option. Id. If so, two million is a 
“conservative” estimate of the number of gay, lesbian, and bisexual Americans who 
have contemplated adoption.  
 269. Gerald P. Mallon, Lesbian and Gay Prospective Foster and Adoptive 
Families: The Homestudy Assessment Process, in ADOPTION BY LESBIANS AND GAY MEN 
130, 131 (David M. Brodzinsky & Adam Pertman ed., 2012). 
 270. Goldberg et al., supra note 260, at 959–60. Another study surveyed 106 
adoptive families—twenty-nine lesbian couples, twenty-seven gay male couples, and 
fifty heterosexual couples—and found that “the vast majority of heterosexual[s] . . . 
reported ‘challenges with infertility’ as a motivation for adopting children,” while less 
than half of the (necessarily dysfertile) same-sex couples offered this reason. Rachel H. 
Farr & Charlotte J. Patterson, Lesbian and Gay Adoptive Parents and Their Children, 
in LGBT-PARENT FAMILIES, INNOVATIONS IN RESEARCH AND IMPLICATIONS FOR 
PRACTICE 39, 42 (Abbie E. Goldberg & Katherine R. Allen eds., 2013). 
 271. Farr & Patterson, supra note 270, at 42; RACHEL H. FARR, MOTIVATIONS 
TO ADOPT AMONG LESBIAN, GAY, AND HETEROSEXUAL PARENTS: ASSOCIATIONS WITH 
COPARENTING AND MENTAL HEALTH (poster presented at the annual Meeting of the 
Society for Personality and Social Psychology, New Orleans, January 2013) (on file 
with author). 
 272. Abbie Goldberg et al., Perception and Internalization of Adoption Stigma 
Among Gay, Lesbian, and Heterosexual Adoptive Parents, 7 J. GLBT FAM. STUD. 132, 
136 (2011). 
 273. Farr & Patterson, supra note 270, at 45. See also GOLDBERG, supra note 
114, at 60 (citing a 2012 study of gay adoptive fathers in which roughly “half the men . 
. . did not espouse to value or prioritize biology in their relationships with children”). 
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IV. A CRITIQUE OF THE POLITICS OF LGBT PROCREATION 
The previous Part documented what has long seemed a 
quintessential strain of LGBT culture—or indeed cultures, so many 
different lives and lifestyles has an anti-biogeneticist conception of 
family, belonging, and community enabled. It further showed that this 
“kinetic,” as opposed to genetic, idea of kinship has been a matter of 
political and legal principle within LGBT communities and in LGBT 
activism. Nowhere has this principle been pursued more clearly than in 
movement lawyers’ steadfast insistence that procreation and the 
biogenetic connections to which it gives rise are “neither necessary nor 
sufficient” to ground a right to legal recognition as family.274 
“Neither necessary nor sufficient” is hardly the most radical way 
to imagine the relevance of biological to legal parenthood. Plato’s 
Republic, for example, describes an ideal society in which children are 
raised collectively, without knowledge of their progenitors, so as to 
foster allegiance to polis rather than clan.275 The LGBT discourse of 
kinetic kinship makes more modest claims—namely, that biogenetic 
relationships are not superior to non-biogenetic ones and need not be 
more definitive of personal identity. Yet even this relatively moderate 
stance risks dilution as LGBT activists seek to expand and facilitate 
access to ARTs. The problem is not, or not only, that such efforts are 
fueled by, and in turn invigorate and legitimate, biogeneticist 
preferences and practices in the private sphere.276 Of far greater 
concern is biogenetic bias in the politics of LGBT parenthood. This bias 
has two manifestations: first, the markedly different understandings of 
equality—full versus formal, lived versus legal—that underlie 
movement approaches to assisted procreation and adoption, 
respectively; and second, invocations of a fundamental “right to 
procreate” that valorize reproduction, idealize a biological model of 
parenthood, and threaten to entrench regressive doctrines in family and 
constitutional law. 
A. The ART-Adoption Double Standard 
Whether or not they happen to allege violations of positive law, 
LGBT equality arguments about access to ART fall into two broad 
categories: claims of disparate treatment and claims of disparate 
impact.277 The former require relatively little elaboration. As explained 
 
 274. See supra note 174 and accompanying text. 
 275. REPUBLIC OF PLATO 455C–57D (Benjamin Jowett trans., Oxford at the 
Clarendon Press 3d ed., 1908). 
 276. See supra Part II. 
 277. See supra notes 70–88 and accompanying text. 
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in Part I, disparate-treatment claims concern policies and practices that 
specifically disadvantage LGBT people. They provoke identitarian 
umbrage because, in the typical case, they are consciously motivated by 
disapproval, prejudice, or animus. 
Disparate-impact claims, by contrast, concern policies and 
practices that do not single out LGBT people for unfavorable treatment 
but nonetheless affect them disproportionately relative to the population 
at large. In the United States, where such claims are available as a legal 
matter under some but not all antidiscrimination mandates,278 the 
doctrine of disparate impact has been justified under two (not mutually 
exclusive) theories. The first, sometimes called the “fault theory,” sees 
disparate-impact liability as “an evidentiary dragnet” designed to catch 
impermissible but “hidden” motives: deliberately concealed intentions 
to discriminate, as well as (on some interpretations) unconscious bias.279 
The second model of disparate impact liability, sometimes called the 
“effects theory,” sees the doctrine primarily as a tool for eradicating 
policies and practices that, even if not traceable to nefarious intentions, 
preserve status- and identity-based disparities without just cause.280 
Under the fault theory, any policy or practice that tends to hit 
LGBT people harder than non-LGBT people should be subject to a 
rebuttable presumption that it is motivated by antigay, antitrans 
sentiment. Seldom will this presumption be totally unwarranted as 
applied to restrictions on assisted procreation. As we saw earlier, 
hostility to ARTs is often rooted in sex, gender, and kinship norms 
structured around reproductive heterosexuality.281 Yet there are many 
barriers to ART that, whatever may be said of their ultimate wisdom, 
cannot fairly be chalked up to such suspect ideology. Cloning bans, for 
instance, aim to forestall an “effacement of individuality, the 
commodification of children, and the advancement of eugenics.”282 
 
 278. Disparate-impact claims are unavailable under the Equal Protection Clause 
of the federal Constitution, which the Supreme Court has held to prohibit only 
intentional discrimination. See generally Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229 (1976). 
They are permitted, however, under many state and federal antidiscrimination laws. 
Richard A. Primus, Equal Protection and Disparate Impact: Round Three, 117 HARV. 
L. REV. 494, 496 n.15 (2003) (noting permission of such claims under Title VII, the 
Voting Rights Act, the No Child Left Behind Act, and “state laws that use disparate 
impact standards”). 
 279. Pamela L. Perry, Two Faces of Disparate Impact Discrimination, 59 
FORDHAM L. REV. 523, 526 (1991) (identifying the “fault theory” of disparate impact); 
Primus, supra note 278, at 519–20 (noting “ambigu[ity] about whether [the doctrine] 
seeks to discover . . . hidden subconscious discrimination”). 
 280. Perry, supra note 279, at 526 (identifying the “effects theory” of disparate 
impact); Primus, supra note 279, at 587. 
 281. See supra notes 10, 24 and accompanying text. 
 282. Judith Daar, The Prospect of Human Cloning, 33 SETON HALL L. REV. 
511, 540 (2003). 
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Surrogacy prohibitions, too, strike at commodification (here of both 
women and babies), and they show deference to “the potential bond 
between a pregnant woman and the child she bears . . . .”283 More 
prosaic restrictions, like insurance schemes that decline to cover (or do 
not generously cover) ARTs are often “at the[ir] core” policy choices 
about “how best and how justly to allocate scarce medical 
resources.”284 And so on. Far from qualifying as discrimination under 
the fault theory of disparate impact, barriers like these attest to “the 
range of public and private interests at stake” in ART regulation.285 
Such interests also weaken claims of invidious discrimination under the 
effects theory—which, again, imagines disparate impact liability as a 
way to “dismantle hierarchies” that persist for no good reason.286 
There is, to be sure, a place for disparate-impact argumentation in 
LGBT family advocacy. Just because the interests supporting one or 
another obstacle to becoming a parent are “legitimate” for legal 
purposes does not mean that, all things considered, they are persuasive 
as a matter of policy. The LGBT movement is entitled to seek for its 
constituents what a disparate-impact approach promises to achieve: 
substantive as well as formal, lived as well as legal, equality.287 But 
substantive equality in parenthood—equality of opportunity to have 
children—is one thing. Substantive equality in biogenetic parenthood, 
and biogenetic parenthood alone, is quite another. Unfortunately, only 
the latter appears on the movement’s current agenda. 
If access to ART has meant trying to change the rules of the game 
for everybody, access to adoption has simply meant subjecting LGBT 
people to the same rules as everyone else. Despite the multiplicity of 
barriers that clutter this route to parenthood, LGBT adoption advocacy 
is limited almost exclusively to fighting disparate treatment based on 
sexual orientation and gender identity.288 This silence is especially 
suspicious given that adoption is, if anything, more susceptible than 
ART to disparate-impact analysis. LGBT people are disproportionately 
 
 283. Kimberly M. Mutcherson, Transformative Reproduction, 16 J. GENDER 
RACE & JUST. 187, 217 (2013). 
 284. Blake, supra note 2, at 701.  
 285. Marsha Garrison, Law Making for Baby Making, 113 HARV. L. REV. 835, 
859 (2000). 
 286. Primus, supra note 279, at 518–19. 
 287. See, e.g., Girardeau A. Spann, Disparate Impact, 98 GEO. L.J. 1133, 
1135–36 (2010) (“[B]ecause the nature of our racial discrimination problem is systemic 
rather than episodic,” the disparate-impact theory “seems to offer the most realistic 
hope of [using] . . . the legal system to . . . overcome . . . white privilege”). 
288.  Notably, not one of the 138 entities that comprise the “working group” 
lobbying in favor of the Adoption Tax Credit Refundability Act is an LGBT-rights 
organization. See About Us, SAVE THE ADOPTION TAX CREDIT, 
http://adoptiontaxcredit.org/about/ [https://perma.cc/ER5B-6VMM] (last visited Oct. 
26, 2016). 
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represented in two groups, perhaps three, with direct interests in 
expanding access to adoption. First and foremost are the many LGBT 
children and adolescents who might benefit from being raised by people 
other than their biological parents. Numerous studies confirm that 
sexual minorities are substantially overrepresented among homeless 
youth and among youth in foster care.289 Adoption may not be the best 
solution for all of these minors, but surely it would be good for the 
many whose birth parents cannot or will not learn to accept them.290 
Second, LGBT people also may be overrepresented in the class of 
biological parents who want or need to relinquish a child for adoption. 
Relative to the general population, LGBT procreators tend to conceive 
and bear offspring at earlier ages and, perhaps surprisingly, LGBT 
people “are more likely [than non-LGBT people] to experience 
unintended pregnancy and fatherhood.”291 Third, LGBT adults are more 
likely to “need” adoption than their straight, cisgender counterparts; the 
same “structural infertility” that drives many prospective LGBT parents 
into the ART clinic propels many others toward adoption agencies. No 
doubt the latter trajectory would be even more common if adoption 
were not so difficult. 
 
 289. See, e.g., SOON KYU CHOI ET AL., WILLIAMS INST., SERVING OUR YOUTH 
2015: THE NEEDS AND EXPERIENCES OF LESBIAN, GAY, BISEXUAL, OR TRANSGENDER, 
AND QUESTIONING YOUTH EXPERIENCING HOMELESSNESS 4 (2015) (finding that twenty-
seven percent of individuals accessing homeless youth services identify as gay, lesbian, 
or bisexual, and that two percent identify as transgender); LAURA E. DURSO & GARY J. 
GATES, WILLIAMS INST., SERVING OUR YOUTH 3 (2012), 
http://williamsinstitute.law.ucla.edu/wp-content/uploads/Durso-Gates-LGBT-Homeless-
Youth-Survey-July-2012.pdf [https://perma.cc/DQS7-HYL6] (“LGBT youth represent 
between 30% and 43% of those served by drop-in centers, street outreach programs, 
and housing programs.”); U.S. INTERAGENCY COUNCIL ON HOMELESSNESS, 
FRAMEWORK TO END YOUTH HOMELESSNESS 11 (2013) (noting that LGBTQ people are 
“overrepresented” among homeless youth); BIANCA D.M. WILSON ET AL., WILLIAMS 
INST., SEXUAL AND GENDER MINORITY YOUTH IN LOS ANGELES FOSTER CARE 6 (2014), 
http://www.acf.hhs.gov/sites/default/files/cb/pii_rise_lafys_summary.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/K543-N764] (finding that nineteen percent of youths in out-of-home 
care in Los Angeles County identify as LGBTQ and that the percentage of LGBTQ 
youth in foster care is one-and-one-half to two times greater than the percentage of 
LGBTQ in the general population). 
 290. LGBT youth’s overrepresentation in the homeless and foster populations is 
largely and directly attributable to rejection by families of origin. See, e.g., CHOI ET 
AL., supra note 289, at 5; ANDREW CRAY ET AL., CTR. FOR AM. PROGRESS, SEEKING 
SHELTER: THE EXPERIENCES AND UNMET NEEDS OF LGBT HOMELESS YOUTH 9 (2013); 
HUMAN RIGHTS CAMPAIGN, LGBTQ YOUTH IN THE FOSTER CARE SYSTEM 1–2 (2015). 
 291. Both of these findings are largely explained by the distinctive stresses of 
growing up queer in a homophobic and transphobic society. See Gary J. Gates, 
Marriage and Family: LGBT Individuals and Same-Sex Couples, 25 FUTURE OF CHILD. 
67, 73 (2015). 
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Among the thousands of LGBT people who would like to adopt 
and the millions who have seriously considered it,292 there are countless 
individuals who assume, are told, or learn from firsthand experience 
that the impediments between them and an adoptive child are 
numerous, steep, and go well beyond the prospect of discrimination 
based on sexual orientation and gender identity.293 Such “impediments,” 
as the term is used here, tend to cluster on the “demand” rather than 
“supply” side of the “adoption market.”294 Supply-side barriers relate to 
the quantity and characteristics of children eligible for adoption. The 
market’s so-called “shortage” of “healthy white infants” would fall into 
this category,295 as would policies geared toward preserving existing 
bonds between birth parents and their children—including the kinds of 
direct welfare provision that sometimes obviate the need to consider 
 
 292. See supra notes 266–269 and accompanying text. 
 293. The idea that adoption is difficult, while at least certain forms of ART are 
easy, echoes throughout the literature on why people choose the latter. See, e.g., Susan 
Frelich Appleton, Adoption in the Age of Reproductive Technology, 2004 U. CHI. 
LEGAL F. 393, 428 (acknowledging a common desire for biological children, but 
suggesting that “the current preference for ARTS” may have more to do with the 
“specific disadvantages of contemporary adoption practice”); Nicholas K. Park et al., 
How Law Shapes Experiences of Parenthood for Same-Sex Couples, J. GLBT FAM. 
STUD. 1, 17–18 (2015) (finding, in a study comparing same-sex couples’ paths to 
parenthood in California and Nebraska, that state “law was an important influence on 
[decisions about which] method to use to achieve parenthood”); Jurgen De Wispelaere 
& Daniel Weinsock, State Regulation and Assisted Reproduction: Balancing the 
Interests of Parents and Children, in FAMILY-MAKING: CONTEMPORARY ETHICAL 
CHALLENGES 131, 143 (Françoise Baylis & Carolyn McLeod eds., 2014) (arguing that 
the adoption process as presently constituted is so “burdensome . . . that adoption 
should not be regarded as equivalent to ART when it comes to satisfying” individuals’ 
desires to become parents). 
 294. For a paradigmatic use of precisely such economic terminology in this 
context, see RICHARD A. POSNER, SEX AND REASON 408 (1992). 
 295. Without minimizing the potential challenges of adopting transracially or 
adopting an older child, it makes little sense to treat (usually) white adopters’ strong 
preference for white children and many adopters’ preference for infants (as opposed to 
older children) as “barriers” to adoption. In addition to reinforcing the second-class 
status of children who do not match this description, there would seem to be few 
ethically defensible ways to increase the pool of adoptable babies who do match it. For 
relevant discussions, see GOLDBERG, supra note 114, at 49–50 (discussing the 
preference for infants); Pertman & Howard, supra note 195, at 29 (discussing the 
preference for healthy infants); JUDITH STACEY, UNHITCHED 62–63 (2011) (comparing 
the “white infants” that ARTs enable “[a]ffluent, mainly white couples” to parent with 
the “grab bag of . . . generally older, darker, and less healthy” children available from 
public adoption agencies); Michele Goodwin & Naomi Duke, Parent Civil Unions, 
2013 U. ILL. L. REV. 1337, 1386 (2013) (discussing the preference for white infants); 
Scott Ryan & Courtney Whitlock, Becoming Parents, 19 J. GAY & LESBIAN SOC. SERV. 
1, 6 (2008) (discussing the “unavailability of healthy children in public agencies”).  
1112 WISCONSIN LAW REVIEW 
relinquishing a child at all.296 Policies like these should have particular 
resonance among LGBT people, who have ample experience with 
unjust estrangement, legal and otherwise, from their offspring.297 
In contrast to many supply-side barriers, obstacles on the demand 
side of the adoption market tend to reflect irrational mistrust of non-
biogenetic parenthood, not due regard for extant parent-child 
relationships.298 These obstacles include an “intrusive” and often 
“demeaning” screening process,299 endless paperwork and “red 
tape,”300 and confusing regulations that vary from one jurisdiction to 
another301—all of which can be expensive to navigate302—as well as the 
collapse of the international adoption market303 and persistent 
discrimination based on age,304 sex,305 race,306 class,307 ability,308 and 
 
 296. For a powerful statement of the need for more rather than fewer 
protections and provisions of this sort, see generally DOROTHY ROBERTS, SHATTERED 
BONDS (2001). 
 297. See supra notes 208–209 and accompanying text. Its experience with 
discriminatory deprivations of parental rights is one reason why the LGBT community 
once accommodated “one of the most robust spaces of debate . . . . about the politics of 
transracial and transnational adoption . . . .” LAURA BRIGGS, SOMEBODY’S CHILDREN: 
THE POLITICS OF TRANSRACIAL AND TRANSNATIONAL ADOPTION 242, 257 (2012). 
 298. See BARTHOLET, supra note 136, at 48, 231 (arguing that “obstacles” in 
the “current regulatory framework” “signal adoption’s inferiority to the biologic family 
and proclaim the dangers allegedly inherent in raising children apart from their birth 
families”); Goldberg et al., supra note 272, at 132–33 (noting the influence of 
biogeneticist “ideology . . . [on] the social institution of adoption”).  
 299. Mahoney, supra note 116, at 50. See also MODELL, supra note 262, at 95 
(describing “probing, intrusive, and humiliating” questions regarding, for example, 
“one’s sex life, contentment in marriage, and feelings for one’s parents”). 
 300. See MODELL, supra note 262, at 95 (describing “loads and loads of forms 
to fill out”); Susan Frelich Appleton & Robert A. Pollak, Exploring the Connections 
Between Adoption and IVF: Twibling Analyses, 95 MINN. L. REV. 60, 67 (2011) 
(“[T]he protective restrictions and other legal ‘red tape’ . . . discourage adoption but 
not [in vitro fertilization] . . . .”). 
 301. Cahn & Hollinger, supra note 17, at 5 (describing a “complex web of 
different, and often inconsistent, . . . laws and . . . procedures at the state, national, 
and international level[s]”). 
 302. Goodwin & Duke, supra note 295, at 1341 (discussing “implicit and 
explicit economic criteria [that] often preclude working class and middle class . . . 
families from adopting”). 
 303. For a superb collection of essays on the contemporary state of 
international adoption, including several that argue for correcting and preventing abuses 
in that market (rather than abandoning it altogether), see generally THE INTERCOUNTRY 
ADOPTION DEBATE: DIALOGUES ACROSS DISCIPLINES (Robert L. Ballard et al. eds., 
2015). 
 304. See Sara C. Mills, Perpetuating Ageism via Adoption Standards and 
Practices, 26 WIS. J.L. GENDER & SOC'Y 69 (2011). 
 305. GOLDBERG, supra note 114, at 27, 70–71 (describing how stereotypes of 
men as “less effective nurturers and caretakers than women” influence the work of 
some social workers and adoption agencies). 
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marital status.309 An advocate concerned about lived equality in 
parenthood generally, as opposed to biogenetic parenthood specifically, 
would recognize these barriers as disparate impacts amenable to 
correction though direct services to constituents,310 public education,311 
government subsidies,312 and reform of the adoption process itself.313 
 
 306. See Richard F. Storrow, Marginalizing Adoption Through the Regulation 
of Assisted Reproduction, 35 CAP. U.L. REV. 479, 512 (2006) (counting “de facto race 
matching” among agency practices that “complicate [potential parents’] ability to 
adopt”). 
 307. See Goodwin & Duke, supra note 295 and accompanying text.  
 308. See NAT'L COUNCIL ON DISABILITY, ROCKING THE CRADLE: ENSURING THE 
RIGHTS OF PARENTS WITH DISABILITIES AND THEIR CHILDREN 185–92 (2012).  
 309. See ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 8-103 (prohibiting adoption by unmarried 
persons); UTAH CODE ANN. § 78B-6-117(3) (West 2016) (same). The Every Child 
Deserves a Family Act would prohibit federally funded adoption and foster care 
agencies from discriminating based on sexual orientation, gender identity, or marital 
status. H.R. 2449, 114th Cong. (2015). 
 310. Constituent education appears to be the only exception to the rule that 
individuals and institutions identified with the LGBT movement do not concern 
themselves with access to adoption beyond efforts to eradicate disparate-treatment 
discrimination. Certain organizations are devoted specifically to this kind of outreach, 
see generally LGBT Adoptions, LIFELONG ADOPTIONS, 
http://www.lifelongadoptions.com/lgbt-adoption [https://perma.cc/YJK9-8F93] (last 
visited Oct. 26, 2016), and some local LGBT groups regularly host information 
sessions about adoption and foster care. See, e.g., Calendar of Events, LESBIAN, GAY, 
BISEXUAL, & TRANSGENDER COMMUNITY CTR. (N.Y.C.), https://gaycenter.org/calendar 
[https://perma.cc/C3L6-PNZ2] (last visited Nov. 16, 2016) (advertising “parenthood 
planning workshops . . . [and a]doption, foster care, alternative insemination/IVF and 
surrogacy referrals”). 
 311. BARTHOLET, supra note 136, at 37–38, 77 (proposing to make useful 
information about adoption “available . . . to those suffering from infertility . . . early 
in their struggles” and to actively encourage people “capable of procreation to consider 
adoptive or foster parenting instead”); GOLDBERG, supra note 114, at 43 (describing 
“[m]any” gay adoptive fathers who “not[ed] that that the more they came to learn about 
adoption, the more it felt like a viable, attractive, and meaningful option to them”); 
Michele Goodwin, The Free-Market Approach to Adoption, 26 B.C. THIRD WORLD L.J. 
61, 77 (2006) (advocating state-sponsored education campaigns about adoption).  
 312. Federal tax credits and special subsidies relating to children with special 
needs helped to more than double the annual number of adoptions from foster care. See 
Cahn & Hollinger, supra note 17, at 2. See also Carolyn J. Head, Adopting the Right 
Incentives, 9 J.L. ECON. & POL’Y 717, 727 (2013) (arguing for further financial 
incentives to “encourage[] . . . [people] to adopt”). 
 313. Some commentators have called for outright elimination of parental 
screening, concluding that the double standard applied to adoptive versus biological 
parents—whereby the former must undergo a rigorous test of fitness while the latter are 
presumed fit—is unjustifiable. McLeod & Botterell, supra note 23, at 151. A less 
drastic approach would be to assume the suitability of “[a]ll who want to become 
adoptive parents” and reduce the screening process to a bare minimum by pegging 
adoption standards to those “used to decide when children can be removed from blood-
linked parents.” BARTHOLET, supra note 136, at 78. 
1114 WISCONSIN LAW REVIEW 
More ambitiously, we might ask whether the LGBT community’s 
distinctive kinship traditions, its “more fluid conceptions of ‘family,’” 
can inspire new ways of thinking about when and how to support 
nurturing relationships between adults and other people’s (usually 
biological) children.314 Is it possible, for example, to “avuncularize” 
certain foster relationships, allowing children to form meaningful and 
even permanent attachments to individuals who presumably will not 
become their legal parents, but who are ready to take on, as needed, 
more or less parental responsibility?315 The political, legal, and social 
hurdles to formalizing such arrangements may be too steep to overcome 
anytime soon,316 but complementary—and comparably bold—proposals 
for “non-exclusive parenting” arrangements have garnered attention 
and admiration among experts on family law and child welfare.317 
In sum, whereas the logic of disparate impact discrimination 
dominates LGBT activism in the ART context, it is almost entirely 
absent in the adoption context. This disparity signifies a belief, however 
implicit or even unconscious on the part of individual actors, that 
 
 314. E-mail from Johanna Oreskovic, Law Professor, SUNY Buff. Law Sch., 
to author (Sept. 10, 2015, 11:23 AM) (on file with author). 
 315. Id. This proposal contemplates a significant departure from current legal 
practice.  
[W]hen family law does recognize the efforts of nonparetal caregivers who 
lack biological or legal ties to a child, it does so only where they have 
assumed completely parental roles and responsibilities. . . . [It] is decidedly 
less comfortable recognizing nonparents when they are not functioning as 
parents, but rather, with parents in providing care. 
Melissa Murray, The Networked Family: Reframing the Legal Understanding of 
Caregiving and Caregivers, 94 VA. L. REV. 385, 387 (2008). 
 316. The Supreme Court has jealously guarded the bright line that separates 
parenthood from all other adult-child relationships. In 1977, a six-justice majority 
declined to hold that foster parents have a constitutional interest in a relationship with 
their foster children, while three justices went out of their way to deny such an interest, 
stating that “any case where . . . foster parents had assumed the emotional role of the 
child’s natural parents would represent not a triumph of the system, to be 
constitutionally safeguarded from state intrusion, but a failure.” Smith v. Org. of Foster 
Families For Equal. & Reform, 431 U.S. 816, 847 (1977); id. at 861 (Stewart, J., 
concurring). Twenty-three years later, in a case involving grandparents who sought, 
over their daughter-in-law’s objection, to maintain a relationship with their 
grandchildren, the Court struck down a state statute authorizing visitation rights for 
“any person” who could show that visitation was in the best interest of the child. See 
Troxel v. Granville, 530 U.S. 57 (2000). 
 317. See, e.g., Katherine T. Bartlett, Rethinking Parenthood as an Exclusive 
Status: The Need for Legal Alternatives When the Premise of the Nuclear Family Has 
Failed, 70 VA. L. REV. 879 (1984); Josh Gupta-Kagan, Non-Exclusive Adoption and 
Child Welfare, 66 ALA. L. REV. 715 (2015); Laura T. Kessler, Community Parenting, 
24 WASH. U. J.L. & POL’Y 47 (2007); Susan Vivian Mangold, Extending Non-Exclusive 
Parenting and the Right to Protection for Older Foster Children: Creating Third 
Options in Permanency Planning, 48 BUFF. L. REV. 835 (2000); Murray, supra note 
315. 
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biogenetic parenthood is a more worthwhile priority, a more important 
prerogative, than adoptive parenthood. This belief persists despite the 
disproportionately large quantity of LGBT children legally estranged 
from their biological families, despite continued interest among many 
LGBT people in adopting, and despite the wide range of reforms that 
the movement might consider were it to imagine equality in adoption as 
capaciously as it now imagines equality in procreation. 
In neither context, however, should the goal be to secure children 
for prospective parents by any means possible. Just as there are non-
discriminatory motivations for any number of restrictions on ARTs, 
there are legitimate reasons for certain “impediments” to adoption—
particularly, again, on the so-called “supply side . . . of the adoption 
market.”318 The desire to have a child, whether adoptive or biological, 
must be balanced against other, sometimes weighty, considerations. 
Regardless of the type of parenthood at issue, cases of disparate-impact 
discrimination demand a different kind of analysis than cases of 
disparate treatment. In debates over the former, LGBT activists cannot 
presume to hold the moral high ground they rightfully occupy in 
debates over the latter. There may be some efforts to expand access to 
parenthood in which it is inappropriate to don the mantle of equality 
and irresponsible to raise the specter of discrimination.319 
B. The Perilous Right to Procreate 
The previous section described how barriers to LGBT procreation 
are held to a higher standard of equality than barriers to LGBT 
adoption. Perhaps this double standard is justified? Procreation, after 
all, is a fundamental right, protected as such under international law 
and the United States Constitution.320 Adoption is not. 
 
 318. See supra note 294 and accompanying text.  
 319. As legal theorists Mark Kelman and Gillian Lester have argued regarding 
the use of discrimination frameworks to justify channeling educational resources to 
learning disabled students, “[m]any perfectly just claims—as well . . . [some] that are 
either intrinsically unworthy or must be balanced against competing concerns—are 
not,”  properly understood, “civil rights claims . . . .” Mark Kelman & Gillian Lester, 
Ideology and Entitlement, in LEFT LEGALISM/LEFT CRITIQUE 134, 163 (Wendy Brown 
& Janet Halley eds., 2002). 
 320. On the right’s status under the Constitution, see infra notes 333–352. On 
its implicit protection under international law, see, for example, G.A. Res. 2200A 
(XXI) International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, art. 23 (naming “[t]he right 
of men and women of marriageable age to marry and to found a family”); G.A. Res. 
2200A (XXI), International Covenant on Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights, art. 10 
(Dec. 16, 1966) (“The widest possible protection and assistance should be accorded to 
the family, which is the natural and fundamental group unit of society, particularly for 
its establishment . . . .”). See also U.N. HUMAN RIGHTS COMM., General Comment 
No. 19 art. 23 (Thirty-ninth session 1990), http://www.refworld.org/cgi-
bin/texis/vtx/rwmain?page=publisher&docid=45139bd74&skip=0&publisher=HRC&
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We have heard this distinction before—most gallingly in Lofton v. 
Department of Children & Family Services,321 a challenge to Florida’s 
prohibition of “adoption by any ‘homosexual’ person,”322 the same ban 
we encountered earlier in connection with Anita Bryant’s “Save Our 
Children” crusade of 1977.323 Lead plaintiff Steven Lofton was a 
pediatric nurse who had “raised from infancy three . . . foster 
children,” all of them HIV-positive.324 Lofton argued, inter alia, that 
Florida’s ban discriminated against gay people in violation of the Equal 
Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment and unjustifiably 
burdened his right under Lawrence v. Texas325 to choose same-sex 
relationships.326 In 2014, the Eleventh Circuit rejected all of Lofton’s 
claims, emphasizing that “there is no fundamental right to adopt, nor 
any fundamental right to be adopted.”327 To the contrary, it said, 
“‘adoption . . . is a statutory privilege.’ Unlike biological parenthood, 
which precedes and transcends formal recognition by the state, adoption 
is wholly a creature of the state.”328 
The distinction between a right and a statutory privilege was no 
answer to the main constitutional grievances at issue in Lofton, as Judge 
Rosemary Barkett maintained in a commanding and ultimately 
vindicated dissent.329 Nor is the right/privilege distinction an answer 
here to the charge that LGBT parenthood advocacy takes a more robust 
view of equality in procreation than of equality in adoption. The 
distinction fails even as a matter of strategy. If adoption proponents 
lack recourse to the politically potent discourse of fundamental rights, 
 
querysi=Thirty-ninth%20session%201990&searchin=fulltext&sort=date (“The right 
to found a family implies, in principle, the possibility to procreate and live together.”). 
 321. 358 F.3d 804 (11th Cir.), reh'g denied en banc, 377 F.3d 1275 (11th Cir. 
2004). 
 322. Id. at 806–07. 
 323. See supra notes 188–192 and accompanying text. 
 324. Lofton, 358 F.3d at 807. 
 325. 539 U.S. 558 (2003).  
 326. Lofton, 358 F.3d at 809.  
 327. Id. at 812. 
 328. Id. at 809 (quoting State Dep’t of Health & Rehab. Servs. v. Cox, 627 So. 
2d 1210, 1216 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1993)). 
 329. See Lofton v. Dep’t of Children & Family Servs., 377 F.3d 1275, 1310 
(11th Cir. 2004) (Barkett, J., dissenting) (citing Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618 
(1969)) (insisting that “the Supreme Court long ago rejected the rights/privileges 
distinction”). Judge Barkett’s dissent was one of the earliest and one of the only judicial 
opinions to say that Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558 (2003), recognized a fundamental 
right. That interpretation was explicitly endorsed in Obergefell v. Hodges, 135 S. Ct. 
2584, 2606 (2015) (stating that Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186 (1986), “upheld 
state action that denied gays and lesbians a fundamental right”). Five years before 
Obergefell, Florida’s ban on adoption by homosexual persons was invalidated under the 
equal protection clause of the state constitution. See Fla. Dep't of Children & Families 
v. Adoption of X.X.G., 45 So. 3d 79 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2010). 
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they can nevertheless appeal, as ART proponents cannot, to the 
wellbeing of thousands of live children.330 Of course this is more than a 
point about relative rhetorical advantage. Just as one might think, as 
law professor Elizabeth Bartholet asserts, that “a sane and humane 
society should encourage people to provide for existing children rather 
than bringing more children into the world,”331 one could likewise 
argue that access to adoption should be a more pressing movement 
priority than access to reproductive technologies. That is not the 
argument here—to correct the procreation/adoption hierarchy is not 
necessarily to invert it—but Bartholet’s reasoning illuminates why, 
morally and politically, the right to procreate’s constitutional pedigree 
does nothing to excuse the ART-adoption double standard. 
And what, exactly, is meant by a “right to procreate?” Normally 
the term refers to one of two entitlements. The first, a right “very 
simply . . . to have natural children,”332 could be thought to serve a 
number of human interests, among them species survival, bodily 
integrity, sexual autonomy, and personal longings for genetic 
immortality. The second, a compound right to both have and rear one’s 
“natural children,”333 presumably serves many of the desires (surveyed 
 
 330. The number of children eligible for adoption in the United States is 
consistently above 100,000. See U.S. DEP’T OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS., THE 
AFCARS REPORT NO. 21, at 1 (2014), 
https://www.acf.hhs.gov/sites/default/files/cb/afcarsreport21.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/2DLY-8N3F]. 
 331. BARTHOLET, supra note 136, at 35–36. See also Head, supra note 312, at 
718 (“[G]iven the choice between adoption and IVF, it is more beneficial to society for 
prospective parents to choose adoption.”). 
332.   See In re Baby M., 537 A.2d 1227, 1253 (N.J. 1988) (stating that right to 
procreate, “whether through sexual intercourse or artificial insemination,” does not 
extend to “[t]he custody, care, companionship, and nurturing that follow birth”); Aditi 
Gowri, Reproduction, Rights and Public Policy: A Framework for Assessment, 35 TEX. 
INT'L L.J. 13, 22 (2000) (speaking of a “right to reproduce oneself”); Lynn D. Wardle, 
“Multiply and Replenish”: Considering Same-Sex Marriage in Light of State Interests in 
Marital Procreation, 24 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 771, 782 (2001) (interpreting 
Skinner v. Okla. ex rel. Williamson, 316 U.S. 535 (1942), to have protected 
“procreation for social survival”). 
333.   See John Lawrence Hill, What Does It Mean to Be A ‘Parent’?, 66 N.Y.U. 
L. REV. 353, 368–69 (1991) (arguing that “exercising the right of procreation is 
sufficient to make one a ‘parent’ in the legal sense” and that the right would be 
“virtually empty” if it were not); John A. Robertson, Procreative Liberty and the 
Control of Conception, Pregnancy, and Childbirth, 69 VA. L. REV. 405, 406 (1983) 
[hereinafter Robertson, Control of Conception, Pregnancy, and Childbirth] (asserting 
that the right to procreate includes the rights “to become pregnant and to parent"); John 
A. Robertson, Procreative Liberty in the Era of Genomics, 29 AM. J.L. & MED. 439, 
447 (2003) (“[T]he liberty or freedom to have offspring involves the freedom to take 
steps or make choices that result in the birth of biologic offspring . . . .”); Elizabeth 
Scott, Sterilization of Mentally Retarded Persons: Reproductive Rights and Family 
Privacy, 1986 DUKE L.J. 806, 827–33 (speaking of a “right to produce one’s own 
children to rear”). 
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in Part II above) that inform the ubiquitous preference for biological 
children, as well as society’s perceived interests in making individuals 
(rather than the community) primarily responsible for the care of 
children.334 In the case of women, the compound right to procreate also 
evinces respect for maternal attachments formed during pregnancy. 
Only in the first of these two guises—and only retrospectively—has 
the right to procreate been the basis of a Supreme Court holding. In 
1942, Skinner v. Oklahoma ex rel. Williamson335 invalidated a 
compulsory sterilization law on the ground that it “r[a]n afoul of the 
equal protection clause.”336 In dicta, the Court stated that “the right to 
have offspring” is “one of the basic civil rights of man”—“basic,” that 
is, “to the perpetuation of a race.”337 More than sixty years later, in 
Obergefell, the Court gave this dicta the dignity of a holding, citing 
Skinner among several precedents that, implicating “precepts of liberty 
and equality,” were decided “under [both] due process and equal 
protection principles.”338 
The picture is murkier when it comes to the compound version of 
the right to procreate. On the one hand, several Supreme Court rulings 
have mentioned in a single breath “rights to conceive and to raise one’s 
children.”339 In one of those decisions, the Court specifically noted that 
“the usual understanding of ‘family’ implies biological relationships, 
and most [of our] decisions treating the relation between parent and 
child have stressed this element.”340 On the other hand, whenever 
unmarried fathers have pressed claims to a legal relationship with their 
offspring, the Court has consistently held that the genetic tie, in and of 
 
 334. On the relationship between a biogenetic understanding of legal 
parenthood and the privatization of responsibility for children, see generally Katharine 
K. Baker, Bionormativity and the Construction of Parenthood, 42 GA. L. REV. 649 
(2008). 
 335. 316 U.S. 535 (1942).  
 336. Id. at 536. 
 337. Id. at 536, 541. 
 338. Obergefell v. Hodges, 135 S. Ct. 2584, 2604 (2015) (emphasis added). 
See also Courtney Megan Cahill, Obergefell and the “New” Reproduction, 100 MINN. 
L. REV. HEADNOTES 1, 8 (2016) (“Obergefell provides an opening for what many . . . 
see lacking in Skinner: a robust articulation of procreation’s substantive constitutional 
dimension.”). 
 339. See Hodgson v. Minnesota, 497 U.S. 417, 447 (1990) (quoting Stanley v. 
Illinois, 405 U.S. 645, 651 (1972)); Smith v. Org. of Foster Families for Equal. & 
Reform, 431 U.S. 816, 843 (1977) (citing Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390 (1923)); 
Weinberger v. Salfi, 422 U.S. 749, 771 (1975) (same); Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U.S. 
645, 651 (1972) (same). 
 340. Smith, 431 U.S. at 843. 
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itself, does not endow a person with constitutionally protected parental 
rights.341 
The boundaries of the right to procreate in American law are 
nothing if not “unsettled,” to recall Professor Obama’s apt 
description.342 Decisions from lower courts reveal considerably more 
about what the right does not protect than what it does.343 Only a 
handful of judgments have invalidated state action on this ground,344 
and in two such cases the court took pains to indicate how the 
government could accomplish essentially the same infringement without 
violating the Constitution.345 A substantially greater number of 
decisions have upheld or imposed both outright deprivations and more 
narrow curtailments: a regulation outlawing uncompensated sperm 
donation;346 a probation condition barring a man from siring additional 
 
 341. See Michael H. v. Gerald D., 491 U.S. 110, 127, 130 (1989); Lehr v. 
Robertson, 463 U.S. 248, 261 (1983); Caban v. Mohammed, 441 U.S. 380, 392, 394 
(1979); Quilloin v. Walcott, 434 U.S. 246, 255 (1978). 
 342. See supra note 97 and accompanying text. Scholars tend to affirm 
Obama’s assessment, regardless of their particular views on what the right to procreate 
ought to protect. See, e.g., Carbone, supra note 185, at 357 (calling the right’s 
“boundaries . . . largely a matter of speculation”); Carter J. Dillard, Rethinking the 
Procreative Right, 10 YALE HUM. RTS. & DEV. L.J. 1, 7, 10 (2007) (criticizing 
“[c]ommon formulations of the procreative right [as] remarkably imprecise” and urging 
a “narrow” interpretation of it); Robertson, Control of Conception, Pregnancy, and 
Childbirth, supra note 333, at 406 (articulating an expansive vision of the right to 
procreate, but acknowledging that the right is “ill-defined and in some respects 
unprotected by the law”).  
 343. I deal here only with decisions, not overturned on appeal or by subsequent 
case law, in which a court squarely holds that a policy violates—or, more often, does 
not violate—the right to procreate. 
 344. See J.R. v. Utah, 261 F. Supp. 2d 1268, 1293 (D. Utah 2002) (holding a 
state law unconstitutional insofar as it made a “preclusive or conclusive” presumption 
that a gestational surrogate, rather than the genetic mother, was the legal mother of the 
resulting child); In re Adoption of an Adult by V.A., 683 A.2d 591, 595 (N.J. Super. 
Ct. Ch. Div. 1996) (holding that the right to procreate required an adoption petitioner 
to give notice to “a natural father of . . . proceedings [that would] terminate his 
parental rights”); Lifchez v. Hartigan, 735 F. Supp. 1361, 1377 (N.D. Ill. 1990) 
(striking an Illinois ban on fetal experimentation that was motivated by opposition to 
abortion but whose wording was broad enough to forbid certain IVF techniques); 
Robinson v. Rand, 340 F. Supp. 37, 41 (D. Colo. 1972) (invalidating an Air Force 
regulation providing for immediate discharge of pregnant members). 
 345. See State v. Talty, 814 N.E.2d 1201, 1205 (Ohio 2004) (striking a 
probation provision that prohibited a man convicted of criminal nonsupport of 
dependents from fathering more children, but suggesting that the condition would have 
been constitutional had it allowed suspension of the prohibition upon fulfillment of 
existing support obligations); Smith v. Superior Court, 725 P.2d 1101, 1104 (Ariz. 
1986) (holding that, absent specific statutory authorization, a trial court did not have 
jurisdiction to impose sterilization as a condition of convicted child abusers’ reduced 
sentences). 
 346. Doe v. Hamburg, No. C-12-3412 EMC, 2013 WL 3783749, at *1 (N.D. 
Cal. July 16, 2013). 
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children until he could fulfill current support obligations;347 an order 
enjoining a “homeless . . . drug abuser” from further childbearing until 
she could take care of extant offspring;348 judicial approval of a 
guardian’s petition to sterilize her mentally incompetent adult 
daughter;349 an employment compensation plan’s treatment of maternity 
leaves a voluntary resignations “without good cause;”350 and rules 
denying prisoners conjugal visits351 and preventing them from sending 
sperm to their wives for the purpose of insemination.352 
Readers uncomfortable with any of the rulings just cited will have 
reason to cheer an LGBT movement that, seeking to protect its own 
constituents’ procreative liberty, could potentially expand that freedom 
for all. Already LGBT plaintiffs are alleging that ART regulations 
violate their right to procreate,353 and it seems likely that the winds of 
marriage equality will blow more such claims into court.354 Diane 
Hinson, founder and owner of a Maryland-based law firm and 
surrogacy agency, predicts that, “[j]ust as it took a Supreme Court 
ruling for same-sex couples to obtain the right to marry nationwide, it 
 
 347. The probationer in this case had been convicted of criminal nonpayment of 
child support. State v. Oakley, 629 N.W.2d 200, 202 (Wis. 2001). See also State v. 
Kline, 963 P.2d 697 (Or. Ct. App. 1998) (sustaining probation conditions that require 
convicted child abusers to complete drug-abuse treatment and anger-management 
courses before having more children). 
 348. In re V.R., No. 5616-04, 2004 WL 3029874, at *1 (N.Y. Fam. Ct., 
Monroe Cty. Dec. 22, 2004). 
 349. Estate of C.W., 640 A.2d 427 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1994). See also 
Conservatorship of Valerie N., 707 P.2d 760 (Cal. 1985) (holding that a law barring a 
guardian from making this choice on behalf of her mentally incompetent ward violates 
the latter’s procreative liberty). 
 350. Sokol v. Smith, 671 F. Supp. 1243, 1245–46 (W.D. Mo. 1987) (rejecting 
plaintiffs’ claim that the law violated the “fundamental right to reproductive freedom”). 
See also McQuistion v. City of Clinton, 872 N.W.2d 817, 835 (Iowa 2015) (holding 
that refusal to assign pregnant employee to “light duties” did not violate the right to 
procreate). 
 351. See Vaughn v. Hvass, No. C4-99-2184, 2000 WL 730671 (Minn. Ct. 
App. June 6, 2000). 
 352. See Gerber v. Hickman, 291 F.3d 617 (9th Cir. 2002); Goodwin v. 
Turner, 908 F.2d 1395, 1399 (8th Cir. 1990). 
 353. See Second Amended Complaint, supra note 6 at 3, 18–21 (challenging 
New Jersey insurance mandate’s heterosexist definition of infertility as a violation of 
the right to procreate); Appellee’s Answer Brief at 25 n.12, D.M.T. v. T.V.H., 129 So. 
3d 320 (Fla. 2013) (No. SC12-261) (alleging that, as applied to a woman who donates 
ova to her same-sex partner with the intent to raise the resulting child together, a law 
that withholds parental status from gamete donors violates the genetic mother’s 
constitutionally protected rights “to procreate and parent [one’s] child”); Appellant’s 
Opening Brief at 49–51, K.M. v. E.G., 13 Cal. Rptr. 3d 136 (Cal. Ct. App. 1 Dist. 
2004) (No. A101754) (claiming that it violates the “fundamental” right to procreate to 
apply a law similar to the one at issue in D.M.T. v. T.V.H. to a woman who donates 
ova to her same-sex partner with the intent to raise the resulting child together). 
 354. See supra notes 4–5, 327 and accompanying text. 
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may similarly require a legal challenge and a Supreme Court ruling for 
same-sex couples to gain the nationwide right to procreate by 
gestational surrogacy.”355 
But there are dangers here. Consider, first, the “expressive 
harms”356 to nonbiological families that often attend invocations of the 
right to procreate. The LGBT movement’s campaign for marriage 
equality is instructive in this respect. Not all constitutionally protected 
liberties are culturally valorized, but some, like marriage and 
procreation, clearly are—at least for large segments of the 
population.357 Just as LGBT efforts to win the right to marry trumpeted 
“gay couples’ yearning for the dignity of matrimony” and their 
“subscription to the sentimental ideology of marriage,”358 it will be 
exceedingly difficult to affirm the right to procreate without affirming—
or, at least, being taken to affirm—the dominant (i.e., biogeneticist) 
ideal of procreation.359 
To their credit, the major LGBT litigation firms continue to keep a 
safe distance from arguments grounded exclusively in biogenetic 
affinity and from rhetoric that might demean nonbiological 
parenthood.360 Other advocates are not so careful. A recent challenge to 
New Jersey’s insurance mandate features allegations that the law’s 
heterosexist definition of infertility violates the constitutional right to 
procreate by keeping “women in same-sex relationships” from having 
children in the “most effective and healthiest way possible” and by 
 
 355. Diane S. Hinson, Parentage Rights for Same-Sex Couples: State-by-State 
Gestational Surrogacy Laws, 38 FAM. ADVOC. 42, 45 (2016). 
 356. “An expressive harm is one that results from the ideas or attitudes 
expressed through a[n] . . . action, rather than from the more tangible or material 
consequences the action brings about.” Richard H. Pildes & Richard G. Niemi, 
Expressive Harms, “Bizarre Districts,” and Voting Rights: Evaluating Election-District 
Appearances After Shaw v. Reno, 92 MICH. L. REV. 483, 506–07 (1993). 
 357. See, e.g., ROBERTS, supra note 39 (documenting a range of contexts in 
which African-American reproduction and parenthood are devalued and discouraged). 
 358. Michael Boucai, Glorious Precedents: When Gay Marriage Was Radical, 
27 YALE J.L. HUMAN. 1, 76 (2015). 
 359. The Supreme Court went out of its way to suggest that same-sex couples’ 
receipt of the right to marry was contingent on precisely such an affirmation. “Were 
their intent to demean the revered idea and reality of marriage, the petitioners’ claims 
would be of a different order.” Obergefell v. Hodges, 135 S. Ct. 2584, 2594 (2015). 
 360. See supra notes 200–203 and accompanying text. See, e.g., Brief of 
Amici Curiae ACLU Foundation, ACLU of Florida, and Lambda Legal in Support of 
Appellee at 2, 20, D.M.T. v. T.V.H., 129 So. 3d 320 (Fla. 2013) (No. SC12-261) 
(arguing, in a case where one of the plaintiff’s own arguments relied substantially on 
the “fundamental right to procreate and raise children,” that the court could reject that 
argument but still intervene to “protect [a] psychological parent-child relationship”); 
Appellant’s Opening Brief on the Merits at 58–59, K.M. v. E.G., 13 Cal. Rptr. 3d 136 
(Cal. Dist. Ct. App. 2004) (No. A101754) (“[I]t is the relationship a biological parent 
develops with his or her child that is worthy of constitutional protection.”) (internal 
quotations omitted) (citation omitted). 
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“denying some the opportunity to have children at all.”361 Comparable 
things are said about gestational surrogacy, often cast as “the only 
means by which a gay couple can have a child.”362 Recall, too, the 
startling submission that surrogacy bans violate reproductive freedom 
because, “[f]rom the standpoint of a couple whose only hope of 
procreating is through the assistance of a surrogate, a law that 
criminalizes that assistance is no different than [a] law providing for the 
sterilization of convicted felons.”363 As telling as this claim’s rather 
extravagant analogy is the “standpoint” it assumes. The heartrending 
image of a couple with but one “hope of procreating” inevitably trades 
on a preference for biological children that most readers can be 
presumed to share. Most judges too. Recently, in a relationship-
dissolution dispute between a birth mother and a genetic mother, no 
less progressive a bench than the California Supreme Court pointedly 
endorsed “the sanctity of the biological connection.”364 
Such language does more than inflict expressive harm. Legal 
doctrine is built of rhetoric, and rhetoric like this points in disturbing 
doctrinal directions. Rulings grounded in the “sanctity” of biogenetic 
parenthood could undermine instrumentalist rationales for procreative 
liberty—concerns about bodily autonomy, and about sexual and 
relational liberty—that seem more congruent with core LGBT-
movement values.365 They could sow the seeds of a constitutional right 
to pursue “prenatal interventions” that, however wishfully, seek to 
eradicate homosexuality in offspring.366 They could buttress 
constitutional doctrines that draw a sharp distinction between familial 
and nonfamilial, biological and nonbiological, relationships—the same 
doctrines that already hinder some of the more creative adoption 
 
 361. Second Amended Complaint, supra note 6, at 17–18 (emphasis added). 
Although individuals precluded from adopting conceivably could be counted among 
those who, without coverage of IVF, would be “den[ied] . . . the opportunity to have 
children at all,” there is no indication in the complaint that this formulation refers to 
anyone but those whose “financial stability” is put at risk by pursuing assisted 
procreation. Id. 
 362. Knaplund, supra note 96, at 930 (emphasis added). 
 363. Nicolas, supra note 71, at 1281.  
 364. D.M.T., 129 So. 3d at 335 (expressing suspicion of “anything that would 
sever the biological parent-child link”). 
 365. See Radhika Rao, Reconceiving Privacy: Relationships and Reproductive 
Technology, 45 UCLA L. REV. 1077 (1998) (arguing that constitutional rights relating 
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 366. For an argument in favor of such a right and a thoughtful presentation of 
the relevant science, see TIMOTHY F. MURPHY, ETHICS, SEXUAL ORIENTATION, AND 
CHOICES ABOUT CHILDREN (2012). 
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reforms contemplated in the previous section.367 By the same token, 
constitutionalizing “the sanctity of the biological connection”368 might 
embolden judges in same-sex custody disputes—including disputes upon 
dissolution of marriage—to “weigh genetic connections . . . in favor of 
. . . the genetic parent.”369 
More broadly, decisions that affirm the fundamental right to 
procreate in biogeneticist terms can only fortify what Professor 
Katharine Baker calls a “bionormative” parentage regime.370 This is a 
regime whose vices run with—and may well outstrip—its virtues. Its 
“private, exclusive, and binary” model of parenthood saves the state 
money by “identify[ing] two private sources of financial support for 
each child,”371 but the results of this parsimony are abominable—a 
society that trails the industrialized world in child-directed social 
welfare provision and a child support system that leaves millions of 
minors impoverished. This is a regime that fashions a sphere of 
autonomy cherished by some parents but whose violation is often the 
price of state support.372 And while this bionormative regime doubtless 
gives many individuals a sense of security in their legal status (“[a]s a 
matter of biology, one is or is not a parent”), the fact remains that 
official recognition of functional or multiple parental relationships is, as 
LGBT advocates have long contended, sometimes in a child’s best 
interest.373 
In short, access-to-ART arguments grounded in a fundamental 
right to procreate tread on treacherous territory. The dangers of these 
claims, as we have seen, are twofold: they carry a constant risk of 
glorifying biological reproduction at the expense of adoption; and they 
 
 367. See supra notes 320–321, 329 and accompanying text. See also Belle 
Terre v. City of Boraas, 416 U.S. 1, 1 (1974) (upholding an ordinance that reserved 
one-family dwellings to traditional families or “not more than two unrelated persons”). 
 368. D.M.T., 129 So. 3d at 335.  
 369. Jessica Feinberg, Consideration of Genetic Connections in Child Custody 
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(referencing “the long history linking genetics to parental legal rights”). 
 370. Baker, supra note 27. See also Janet L. Dolgin, Biological Evaluations: 
Blood, Genes, and Family, 41 AKRON L. REV. 347, 348 (2008) (meticulously 
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 372. Id. at 678–81. 
 373. Id. at 680–84, 697–99. 
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invite judges to ensconce a preference for biological relationships in our 
family law and constitutional jurisprudence. 
CONCLUSION 
The Argonauts, one of the most acclaimed pieces of creative 
nonfiction in recent memory, is a candid and theoretically sophisticated 
account of author Maggie Nelson’s journey to parenthood—first as de 
facto stepmother to the son of transgender video artist Harry Dodge, 
then as biological mother of the child that, using donor sperm, she had 
with Dodge not long after their marriage. Throughout the book, Nelson 
grapples with a conundrum formulated in terms borrowed from 
philosopher Judith Butler: “When [and] how do new kinship systems 
mime older nuclear-family arrangements [and] when and how do they 
radically recontextualize them in a way that constitutes a rethinking of 
kinship?”374 At one point in the memoir, Nelson derides “the notion of 
having children as the ticket—perhaps the only ticket—to a meaningful 
life,” and she hails the “long history of queers constructing their own 
families—be they composed of peers or mentors or lovers or ex-lovers 
or children or non-human animals . . . .”375 Elsewhere, though, she 
bristles at the assumption that there is a necessary “opposition” between 
“queerness and procreation,”376 and she proposes to define “queer 
family . . . as an umbrella category under which baby making might be 
a subset, rather than the other way around.”377 
This Article shares Nelson’s queer vision of the family as a social 
form that neither excludes nor privileges reproductive parenthood. Its 
critique, rooted in that vision, has aimed not at LGBT procreation, but 
at the biogenetic bias that marks in subtle but important ways political 
efforts to facilitate LGBT access to reproductive technologies. The 
Article’s normative recommendations follow predictably from there. 
LGBT advocates should hold fast to their movement’s venerable anti-
biogeneticist heritage. Individuals and organizations seeking to expand 
opportunities for LGBT parenthood should pursue at least equally 
audacious goals for adoption as for ARTs, and they should show 
restraint and sensitivity, sometimes to the point of forbearance, in their 
invocations of a right to procreate. 
Disavowing the ART-adoption double standard and cautiously 
deploying the right to procreate clearly would redound to the benefit of 
the many LGBT people who do or might wish to adopt, as well as the 
 
 374. MAGGIE NELSON, THE ARGONAUTS 14 (2015) (quoting The Body You 
Want: Liz Kotz Interviews Judith Butler, ARTFORUM 82, Nov. 1992). 
 375. Id. at 71–72. 
 376. Id. at 13. 
 377. Id. at 72. 
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thousands of adoptive families that LGBT people have already 
created.378 Less obvious, perhaps, is what past, present, and future 
LGBT users of reproductive technologies stand to gain. Here we must 
not forget that these unconventional procreators also find themselves at 
a significant remove from the apex of biogeneticism’s hierarchy. Their 
need to have offspring via assisted reproductive technologies, their 
failure to procreate “naturally,” renders them deficient in a kinship 
system that takes coitus as its primary “symbol” and that prizes 
children as incarnations of conjugal love.379 Within this dominant 
system, reproductive technologies promise, at best, a bloodless 
imitation of “the real thing.”380 
Ultimately, then, the very biogeneticism that goes so far in 
explaining the rise of ARTs belittles the families that ARTs enable.381 
This ideology also belittles adoption, of course, but since adoption, in 
its paradigmatic form, has no biological basis whatsoever, it goes 
farther and is less equivocal in challenging the dogma that demeans it. 
So long as adoption is seen as inferior, families created by ART will 
necessarily suffer the same fate, because families created by ART share 
the same imagined defect. Assisted procreation cannot be equal until 
adoption is too. 
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